

BOOK REVIEWS

DAVID AYALON, *Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study of Power Relationships* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1999). Pp. 387. \$38.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JANE HATHAWAY, Department of History, Ohio State University, Columbus

David Ayalon died in June 1998 after a scholarly career of well over half a century, during which he molded the historiography of the Mamluk sultanate, to say nothing of Mamluk studies generally. Throughout his career, he remained an unabashedly old-school empiricist, poring over Arabic narrative sources to recover the elusive realities of the Mamluk sultanate and earlier Islamic polities. His output consisted principally of lengthy, unassailably scholarly articles, each a model of painstaking source criticism and meticulous argumentation. As a result of those articles, we know the structures of the Mamluk sultanate's armies; the true nature of the Mamluk sultanate's relationship to the Mongols; the uses of banishment in the Mamluk sultanate; the place of Circassians in the sultanate; and the overall history of the *mamlūk*, or military slave, institution, to list but a few of the many key topics on which his research shed light—more often than not, the first rays of light. Surprisingly, Ayalon produced only two books before his death: *L'esclavage du mamelouk* (Israel Oriental Society, 1951) and *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to Medieval Society* (Frank Cass, 1978). Nevertheless, his English-language articles alone easily fill four Variorum reprints volumes, with many to spare.

Although Ayalon will be remembered chiefly for his work on the Mamluk sultanate and *mamlūks* in general, his research did occasionally range beyond this sphere. Of particular note in this regard are two pioneering articles on eunuchs: "On the Eunuchs in Islam," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 1 (1979): 67–124; and "The Eunuchs in the Mamluk Sultanate," in *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, ed. Myriam Rosen-Ayalon (Institute of Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1977), 267–95. Because eunuchs were instrumental in training newly recruited *mamlūks* not only in the Mamluk sultanate but in earlier Islamic polities, Ayalon considered an understanding of their functions critical to any understanding of the Mamluk institution. And because eunuchs mediated between barracks and harem, he also considered the role of women, particularly that of female slave counterparts to the *mamlūks*, key to the Mamluk institution. On the single occasion on which I was fortunate enough to meet Ayalon, at the 1993 American Oriental Society meeting in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, he spoke enthusiastically of his ongoing research into what he called "the great triangle": *mamlūks*, women, and eunuchs. The current book is the product of those labors. The author appears to have worked on it right up to the end: the Preface concludes with a postscript noting that Ayalon's illness prevented him from reviewing the second set of page proofs.

The chief purpose of *Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans* is to explore the uses of eunuchs in Muslim realms, culminating in their role as military educators in the Mamluk sultanate, which Ayalon has already documented. This is inevitably intertwined with the history of the use of *mamlūks*, because eunuchs were from the outset integral components of the *mamlūk* military schools, where they "served as a barrier between the adults and the young Mamluk, as well as between those young adolescent Mamluks themselves" (p. 33). The author's sober discussion

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of this sexual dimension of the eunuchs' role is itself a long-overdue historiographical contribution, counteracting the sensationalist accounts of European observers while broaching the seemingly taboo subject of sexuality in Mamluk halls and barracks.

Aside from their role as sexual buffers, the overriding rationale for eunuchs' employment was their unparalleled loyalty to the very patrons who had them castrated. Ayalon underlines this quality in a pioneering and unprecedented chapter on the role of eunuch commanders on the Byzantine frontier under the Abbasids and Fatimids. Byzantium itself proved to be a rich source of eunuchs for these two rival caliphates, in no small part because Byzantine subjects castrated for service in church choirs bitterly resented their employers and were evidently grateful for their release by Muslim armies. Yet because of their widely remarked loyalty, court eunuchs were indispensable to Muslim regimes and to their Byzantine enemies as intermediaries in prisoner exchanges and truce negotiations.

Much of the rest of the narrative is devoted to tracing the systematic enslavement and employment of eunuchs by Muslim regimes preceding the Mamluk sultanate. Ayalon has suggested elsewhere that the *mawālī*, or largely non-Arab "clients" of Arab tribes in the early years of Islam, may have included *mamlūks*; here, he is perhaps over-eager to equate *mawla* with *mamlūk*, and by virtue of doing so is able to argue that eunuchs were probably in use already under the Rashidun caliphs. More convincing evidence points to their sporadic use under the Umayyads. As Ayalon pointed out in "The Muslim City and the Mamluk Military Aristocracy" (*Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* 2 [1968]: 311–29), large-scale systematic employment of *mamlūks* began with the 'Abbasid caliph al-Mu'tasim (r. 833–42), and was a direct cause of that caliph's construction of a new, *mamlūk*-dominated capital at Samarra, north of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Eunuchs' direct involvement in training *mamlūks* is first documented several decades later, under al-Mu'tadid (r. 892–902). Ayalon also provides evidence of similar eunuch–*mamlūk* combinations under the regional dynasties that arose under the aegis of the Abbasids, notably the Samanids in Khurasan and Transoxiana; the Seljuks in Iran and Iraq, and later in Anatolia; the Zengids in northern Iraq and Syria; and the Ayyubids in Syria and Egypt. In contrast, the rival Fatimid caliphate was, according to Ayalon, unable to engineer a comparably effective eunuch–*mamlūk* power configuration. Although the Fatimids employed Turkic and Sudanese *mamlūks* on the one hand, and Caucasian and eastern African eunuchs on the other—some of whom amassed great power—they were stymied by the geographical difficulty of importing large numbers of Turks and by the unruliness of the Berber armies that had brought them to power. To this reviewer, this conclusion sounds suspiciously like reasoning *post facto*; nevertheless, it is most profitably viewed against the explosion of new research on Fatimid institutions. Although the Mamluk sultanate looms as the *ne plus ultra* of eunuch–*mamlūk* power configurations, it represents a certain break with its predecessors where the role of eunuchs is concerned. Even under the Ayyubid regime, which spawned the Mamluk sultanate, eunuch military commanders, whether black or white, operated on an equal footing with *mamlūks*. Under the Mamluk sultanate, however, eunuchs could rise only to carefully circumscribed ranks, always below those for which *mamlūks* were eligible.

Of particular importance to the evolution of the "great triangle" was the fact that the eunuchs who trained the *mamlūks* belonged to the same pool as those who guarded the palace women's quarters, commonly known as the harem. Thus, eunuchs could serve as literal intermediaries between *mamlūks* and elite women. By this means, Ayalon argues, women and eunuchs became instrumental to the exercising of political power in regimes based on slave soldiers. Thus, the "great triangle" was no aberration, as the habit of singling out the early Mamluk sultana Shajar al-Durr, for example, might lead casual readers to believe. Rather, it was an integral feature of all medieval Muslim regimes that employed *mamlūks*.

The book's last 152 pages consist of an Addendum and twelve appendixes. Unlike the typical appendix, these deserve special attention because each resembles a separate article—not unlike

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the pathbreaking pieces that Ayalon published throughout his career. Each treats a particular feature of eunuchdom, such as the prices of eunuchs and the castration operation, the eunuchs' sex lives, "functions and occupations of eunuchs," and supplementary data on eunuchs as fortress commanders. The only objectionable feature of this section is Ayalon's point-by-point refutation in Appendix A of A. Cheikh Moussa, who had the bad judgment to disagree with Ayalon's equation of the Arabic terms *khādīm* (lit., "servant") and *khaṣī*. The Magnes Press editor cannot have had an easy task, and under the circumstances, no one can be blamed for the occasionally disjointed, notelike quality of the narrative. For all that, the book is well produced, with remarkably few typographical errors or inconsistencies in transliteration, and with a useful list of references and an index.

Ayalon's scholarship has come in for some justifiable criticism in recent years. It is clear in this book, as in his previous publications, that he idealizes the "Mamluk institution" as a coherent phenomenon that transcended individual *mamlūk*-employing regimes; not infrequently, he depicts it as a sort of thousand-year Mamluk Reich, stretching from al-Mu'taṣim straight through to Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. His tendency to extrapolate from the Mamluk sultanate, by far the best-documented and (thanks largely to Ayalon himself) most thoroughly studied *mamlūk* regime, to other polities that used *mamlūks* has likewise overshadowed more detailed revisionist investigations of such polities. This state of affairs is now changing; notwithstanding, revisionist studies of necessity build on the scholarly foundations that Ayalon laid. Indeed, this book, while still reflecting Ayalon's cherished ideals, in certain respects represents his own revisions to his previous work, in particular in its focus on pre-Mamluk sultanate polities. Like his scholarship on *mamlūks*, this book lays an impressive foundation for further study—in this case of eunuchs and their integration into these very polities. It is a valuable final contribution from the doyen of Mamluk studies.

GERTRUDE BELL, *The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell* (Bethesda, Md.: Iranbooks, 1995). Pp. 176.

REVIEWED BY FRANK LEWIS, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.

Though Sir William Jones's captivating English version of a ghazal of Hafez, first published in 1771, inspired many translators in the final years of the 18th and early years of the 19th century, none succeeded in producing a living, breathing body of Hafez's work in English. Goethe, of course, lavished his admiration on Hafez in the *West-Östliche Divan*, and Ralph Waldo Emerson echoed and amplified this praise in America with a number of English translations of von Hammer-Purgstall's German renditions of Hafez. All this attention from trend- and style-setting literary figures did Hafez the favor of creating an interest in and a ready market for translations of his poems. At the same time, however, it burdened him with a literary reputation the expectations of which were difficult for translators to meet. Once FitzGerald's *Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*, perhaps the most successful English verse translation in history, demonstrated the possibility of creating a native English idiom for a poet such as Khayyam, readers' expectations for Hafez only intensified. Though a score of translators have tried their hand at Hafez, none has managed anything more than a satisfactory result.

One of those translators was the remarkable Gertrude Lowthian Bell (1868–1926). In later years, she was posted to Baghdad as a British diplomat, where she played an important role in the creation of the modern state of Iraq after World War I. The account of her experiences there are recorded in *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920). As an author, however, she is remembered primarily for the description of her travels through Syria, *The Desert and the Sown* (1907); her studies of a number of architectural remains there, including

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Churches and Monasteries of the Tur Abdin (1913) and *Palace and Mosque at Ukhaidir* (1914); and her letters, which have been published in several editions. But her first interest was in Persia, through which she traveled in 1892, as recorded in her *Safar Nameh: Persian Pictures, a Book of Travels* (1894). Shortly before leaving, she began to study Persian, to which she applied herself upon her return to England. By 1897, Bell's *Poems from the Divan of Hâfez* had been published in London by Heinemann; a second edition appeared posthumously in 1928, with an Introduction by the Persian scholar Sir E. Denison Ross.

The work under review consists of a reprint of the 1897 edition of Bell's translations of forty-three ghazals (four of which textual scholarship now exclude from the corpus of Hafez), her translator's preface, a further preface by E. Denison Ross from the second edition of 1928, and Bell's notes on the poems. To these have been added a brief Foreword by Farhad Shirzad of Iranbooks and the Persian text of the poems facing the translations. This is not the first time that Bell's work has been reprinted in recent years; the bibliographic precedents for the present volume include *Teachings of Hafez* (London: Sufi Trust, 1979 and 1985) with an Introduction by Idries Shah, and a number of decorative editions printed in Iran, such as *Selected Sonnets from the Divân of Hâfez* (Tehran: Eqbal, 1985), which gives the text of the poems in Persian calligraphy by Hosein Khosravi, adorned with miniatures by Ali Nasajpor and interspersed with Bell's translations.

The reason Bell's Hafez has been so often reprinted is the high estimation of E. G. Browne, who thought that Bell's versions were "true poetry of a very high order," second only to FitzGerald's *Rubaiyat* of Khayyam of all English translations from Persian poetry. Though Arberry, in his 1947 anthology of Hafez translations, was more reserved, he agreed that Bell's effort was the "most felicitous" English version. The poetics of Bell's era, in part due to FitzGerald, are in many ways more hospitable to the images and tropes of classical Persian poetry than our own, and Bell's excellent sense of diction frequently produces an admirable turn of phrase (though to this reviewer's ear, her sense of rhythm often falters).

Over the past century, however, a sea change has occurred in English and American poetics, and Bell's Hafez represents the esthetic of a bygone era. The developments in free verse beginning with Eliot and Pound in the 1910s and 1920s, followed by the Beats, have dated Bell's versions to the extent that they can now be read only as something of a Victorian period piece. They will probably appeal less to a reader eager to discover the poetry of Hafez than to students of Bell, the history of Middle Eastern literature's reception in the West, and the "implosive" method that dominated translation theory for several centuries. This interpretive and interpolative method has, however, been rejected by the scholarly community and generally replaced with a minimalist esthetic. Hafez has yet to find his Chapman or FitzGerald, but readers wishing to encounter him in modern poetic idiom should turn instead to the more modernist rhymed verse of Richard LeGalliene (published just a decade after Bell's), or to the free verse of Basil Bunting, Peter Avery with John Heath-Stubbs, or Elizabeth Gray.

Although the present text may therefore prove useful in more than one way, the serious reader of modern poetry is not likely to respond to it favorably. One assumes that this reprint, like many other recent versions of Hafez (Michael Boylan's [Mage, 1988], Aryanpur's [Mazda, 1981]), will appeal in large measure to Iranians in diaspora wishing to introduce their English-speaking friends to a taste of Hafez, an icon of Iranian national pride due to his erstwhile influence on romantic poetry in Europe. Indeed, Bell's introduction, which covers Hafez's life and the political history of the period, Sufism, and the nature of his poetry, is extremely insightful and judiciously discounts the thoroughgoing mystical allegorizing engaged in by Wilberforce Clarke's translation. Bell's introduction can still be most profitably read by students of Hafez, and her notes to the poems also prove extremely helpful.

The present edition includes the Persian text on facing pages, so it can also be useful to students of Persian language and literature. However, because the Persian text provided follows

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the modern critical edition of Khanlari, not the text available to Bell, students attempting to use this book as a primer for reading the poems in Persian may sometimes become confused. This problem is compounded by the addition of phrases not signaled in the Persian text, which appear either by way of interpretive comments or to fill out the rhyme or meter. Thus, though everyone interested in Hafez may find something of value in *The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell*, it will not fully satisfy any group of readers attracted to Hafez for his own sake.

GAVIN R. G. HAMBLY, ED., *Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, and Piety*, The New Middle Ages (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). Pp. 566.

REVIEWED BY MARGARET L. MERIWETHER, Department of History, Denison University, Granville, Ohio

The historical study of women and gender in the Middle East and Islamic world has come of age. Not so long ago, it was difficult to find good monographs or collections of essays on women's experiences in the past, even as studies of women and gender in the contemporary Islamic world proliferated. As a result, our ability to make sense of women's lives and experiences in the late 20th century suffered from a lack of historical perspective. An enormous amount of work still confronts us in recovering women's experiences, but exciting historical studies, solidly grounded in primary sources, are already changing the way we think about women in Islamic and Middle Eastern history—and, indeed, in some cases they are changing the way we look at that history as a whole. The greatest gains have occurred in the study of the 19th and 20th centuries, when changes in women's lives were particularly visible and the wealth of sources has allowed us to deal with a range of important questions. What we know about women in the early modern period, especially in the Ottoman Empire, is also expanding rapidly. The absence of work and the huge gaps in our knowledge of earlier periods, despite important works such as those by Denise Spellberg and Leila Ahmed, remains a serious problem, however. This collection of essays, *Women in the Medieval Islamic World*, edited by Gavin Hambly, is therefore a very welcome addition to the literature on the history of Muslim women in the pre-modern era.

This volume is part of a series, called The New Middle Ages, that is devoted to trans-disciplinary studies of medieval cultures. It includes twenty essays, all original work on the topic. Collectively, the essays cover the Islamic world from the pre-Islamic period to the mid-19th century and from Central Asia and India in the east to Sudan in the west. Most of the essays are written by historians, but, in keeping with the trans-disciplinary nature of the work, there are also contributions by art historians, sociologists, and scholars of literary and religious studies. Of the twenty chapters, four deal with women and the law. Four others deal with images of women in literature. The rest are primarily concerned with women in public life: as rulers, powers behind the throne, and patrons of architecture and of intellectual life, both religious and secular.

The standard interpretation of Muslim women's history in the centuries after the Prophet's death remains one of declining rights and autonomy and loss of power. According to this interpretation, women had considerable freedom and authority in the early years of the Islamic community, and the Qur'an and hadith provided women with some rights. In later centuries, however, pre-Islamic patriarchal norms and practices kicked in and significantly limited women's visibility and mobility, role in public life, and access to opportunities such as education. The studies in this volume challenge—or, at least, complicate—this interpretation of the history of Muslim women in significant ways. Making use of a range of diverse and often underutilized sources (e.g., rock paintings, coins, devotional literature), these scholars demonstrate how much

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we can learn about women in the pre-modern past if we look in the right places. The overall purpose of this volume is to question the stereotypes of women in the Islamic world as “passive victims of male oppression, without rights, without individuality, and without voices” and to “provide material for a different set of assumptions: women exercising substantive political influence, dispensing considerable material resources for the construction of public buildings, and supporting through direct patronage mystics, saints, and men of letters” (Preface). Women’s visibility, rather than their invisibility—their presence in public life, in public space, and in public (in sense of literary) discourse—is a theme that links these diverse chapters.

We are already aware, because of the work on Ottoman women in the early modern period, that one place where women were visible was the law court. Four of these chapters add to the growing literature on women and the law, especially their access to and use of the law courts. Yvonne Seng uses the records of the Islamic courts to investigate women’s financial transactions in 16th-century Istanbul. She demonstrates the range of these activities and what they reveal about women’s active engagement in the social and economic life of their communities and their access to public space. Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr is also concerned with what court records tell us about the visibility of women in 18th-century Istanbul. Moreover, she addresses the very important issue of change, drawing attention to the evidence suggesting that innovations in the law and legal procedures had a direct impact on women, often in positive ways, and she links that to broader changes in Ottoman society of the 18th century. The other two chapters, by Carl Petry and Leslie Peirce, focus on divorce, an aspect of Islamic law that is often viewed as having a particularly negative impact on women. Both chapters focus on the judicial process and raise the question of how well it served the interests of women. Petry examines a case in which a young woman sued for divorce from her husband, a member of the Mamluk elite, for violation of conjugal rights and how the judge dealt with the tension between legal rights and class prerogatives raised by this lawsuit. Peirce looks at how oral testimony was transformed into written record in divorce cases in 17th-century Aintab and what this tells us about the role of the courts in divorce cases. Both chapters suggest that the answer to the question of whether the interests of the women involved were well served is ambiguous. All four of these chapters also allow us to see the lives of non-elite women.

The chapters by David Pinault, Remke Kruk, Olga Davidson, and Geoffrey Lewis challenge the invisibility of women in a different way. All are concerned with images of women in literature—Pinault with portrayals of the women of the Prophet’s family in Shi’i devotional literature; and Kruk, Davidson, and Lewis with portrayals of women in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish epics, respectively. All emphasize the prominent place of women in these different literary traditions. Kruk and Lewis stress the extent to which the images of women in the epic tradition—as women warriors in Arabic epics or as assertive and independent women in *The Book of Dede Korkut*—were at odds with dominant images in the high literary tradition. Davidson reveals how women’s laments in the *Shahnama* can be read as challenges to male authorities on a political or personal level. Pinault discusses how the changing images of the women of the Prophet’s family in Shi’i literature reflected changing social conditions and world view of the Shi’i community. In all these works of literature women were prominent figures, and images of women in these genres were diverse and complex. All four authors address the complicated question of how to interpret these images. To what extent did image correspond to reality, if at all? What can they tell us about dominant visions of women and gender relations? Are these just male visions, or can they tell us anything about the worldview of women?

The remaining chapters, all of which deal with issues of power and patronage in one way or another, underscore the range of opportunities available to women to participate in public life in the medieval period. Women exercised power in their own right by serving as regents for male relatives, by acting as political consultants, by exercising sovereignty through ceremonial functions, and even, on rare occasions, by commanding royal armies. Moreover, women of

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some royal families were seen as capable of governing, and their political activities and exercise of sovereignty were viewed as legitimate. For example, according to Kathryn Babayan, in the first century of Safavid rule, sovereignty was vested in all members of the ruling family, male and female, and Safavid princesses were blinded, just like their brothers, to prevent their challenging the designated shah. Patronage was another avenue by which these women represented the dynasty in a highly visible way. Women's exercise of patronage was linked to their prestige and access to financial resources. In the Timurid and Mughal dynasties, for example, primary responsibility for representing the piety of the dynasty was placed in the hands of women through their patronage of architecture and religious institutions. Safavid women played a significant role in the intellectual life of Iran as both participants in and patrons of scholarship, a result of their access to education. The chapters by Maria Szuppe, Kathryn Babayan, Stephen Blake, Gavin Hambly, and Gregory Kozlowski on Safavid and Mughal women are particularly noteworthy for highlighting the similarities and differences among the two dynasties, as well as for drawing comparisons and contrasts to Ottoman royal women. They also deal with the questions of changes in these states and the impact of these changes on women. Babayan also offers a fascinating glimpse of non-royal women. The evidence of intense female friendships, of the expectations that wives had of their husbands, and of the degree of mobility afforded to women indicate that it was not just royal women whose lives were different from the stereotype. The chapters on women in Safavid Iran offer a marked contrast to Ronald Ferrier's portrayal of Iranian women of this period as seen through the eyes of European travelers. His argument for the usefulness of such literature for the study of women is unconvincing, in light of what Safavid sources reveal.

This volume deserves to be widely read, not just by specialists in Islamic history. It is a very promising sign that this collection is part of a series on medieval cultures and therefore is being "mainstreamed" into historical studies. The field of Middle Eastern and Islamic history has suffered too long from being isolated from developments in the historical profession as a whole. Unfortunately, there are some features of this collection that will make it less accessible to a more general audience than it should be. The specialized nature and narrow focus of some of the chapters will make them intimidating to non-specialists. More explicit comparison with other cultures could perhaps have mitigated this problem. For example, there is important work by medieval and early modern European historians on women and power and women and public space, work used to good effect in Peirce's study of the Ottoman royal women. Yet little of this literature is brought into these studies. More explicit connections among the chapters—thematically, methodologically, and theoretically—would also have made these studies more accessible to a wider audience. In particular, it is disappointing to those of us who teach undergraduates and wish to integrate the study of women into our Islamic history courses that this collection cannot be readily used for undergraduate teaching. We are still waiting for something that will provide more depth than the surveys by Wiebke Walther and Guity Nashat and Judith Tucker but, at the same time, are accessible to students who have little knowledge of the Islamic world.

One other shortcoming of this collection is the lack of a more explicit discussion of change. The volume is arranged chronologically, but only a very few essays deal with change, and the editor does not address this critical issue. I think this is a particularly important issue to raise directly in a volume that uses the label "medieval" for essays ranging from the 6th to the 19th century and in light of the comment by the series editor—that the volume shows the "long continuity of the Islamic world's medieval period." In not addressing the issue of change and in using this label, is the intention to emphasize continuity over change in the pre-modern period? Does this volume in effect reproduce some stereotypes—changelessness, for example—even as it tries to dispel others? I am not suggesting an answer to these questions; rather, I am arguing that the issues of change and of periodization need to be addressed explicitly as

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we write the history of women and gender in the Islamic world so we can avoid some of the dangers of earlier scholarship.

These comments are not meant to raise questions about the overall quality and importance of this volume. The significance of this work is without question. It brings together important and original research in a single volume. It underscores the fact that restoring women to Islamic history is possible when one asks the right questions and makes creative use of new and often non-traditional sources. It will be particularly useful to scholars and graduate students in the field but will also make those outside the field aware of work that is being done and the way in which our understanding of women in the Islamic world is changing. It should facilitate the process of taking women's history into the mainstream of historical studies.

BABER JOHANSEN, *Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh*, Studies in Islamic Law and Society (Leiden, Boston, Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1999). Pp. 535.

REVIEWED BY COLIN IMBER, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, U.K.

Baber Johansen is perhaps the most original scholar currently working in the field of classical Islamic—predominantly Hanafi—law. It is useful therefore to have fifteen of his articles, not all of which were easily accessible, collected in a single volume, together with a new Introduction. The themes that emerge in the Introduction serve to highlight some of the leitmotifs that occur in the articles that follow. In it, he sketches the development of *fiqh* as a discrete branch of Islamic learning and outlines some of the characteristic Western approaches to its study. The theme of *fiqh* as a development independent of theology and formal ethical literature is one that occurs in several of the articles that follow. In “*Die sündige gesunde Amme*,” Johansen discusses in detail how the systematic reasoning of the jurists and the principle of judging according to only external appearances often led to a sharp distinction between religious ethics and legal rulings. This distinction is also the subject of “*Le jugement comme preuve: preuve juridique et vérité religieuse dans le droit islamique hanéfite*.” Here, he shows how in Hanafi law only what is externally apparent is acceptable as evidence, and how legal proof depends on a formal procedure that recognizes a fixed hierarchy in the different forms of testimony. A consequence of this procedural formalism was that judgments could be unjust but nevertheless valid in law. The injustices that this distinction between legal and ethical norms could on occasion produce was something that the *fuqahā* acknowledged. However, although a judgment could not be reversed, the aggrieved party could bring a new case with new evidence if a court's decision appeared unjust.

The discussion in the Introduction of the study of Islamic law in the West gives some pointers to Johansen's own approach to the subject. He takes issue in particular with the opinions of Snouck Hurgronje and G.-H. Bousquet, who in their writings denied *fiqh* the status of law, treating it instead as a deontology. He is clearly happier with the approach of Chafik Chehata, who, in an effort to lay the intellectual foundation for the codification of Hanafi law, sought to disengage from the classical texts a “general theory.” This is closer to Johansen's approach—although, for those, at least, who are not already fully familiar with the original Hanafi texts, Johansen's work is far more approachable, because he remains closer than does Chehata to the texts themselves. “*Eigentum, Familie und Obrigkeit im Hanfitischen Strafrecht*,” for example, presents a theoretical discussion of the development of the law, showing how under the influence of legal practice, the position of *ta'zir* changed from that of a residual category of punishment to the main category and, in the process, upset the theoretical equilibrium that the classical jurists had established in their construction of penal law. However, the reader without

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a background in the classical texts will find that Johansen gives a very clear account of the legal rules, allowing the non-specialist reader to keep abreast.

The study of change in the law, such as appears in this article, is another theme of Johansen's work. It is also one where he departs radically from earlier Western scholars who insisted on the unchanging nature of Islamic law after its formative period between the 8th and 11th centuries. He also differs from many earlier commentators in that he emphasizes not the triviality of *fiqh* and its remoteness from real life but, rather, its origins in specific historical circumstances and adaptability to changing times. He argues, for example, that the legal definition that the jurists gave to the *'aqila*, the group who were collectively liable for paying the blood money due for involuntary homicide, reflects the social forms of early Islamic cities, which had replaced the tribal ties of the Arabian peninsula. In "Amwal Batina and Amwal Zahira: Town and Countryside as Reflected in the Tax-System of the Hanafite School," he argues that the low rate of *zakat* that the jurists imposed on animals and trade goods, as compared with the heavy taxes on peasant produce, reflects the privileged status of non-peasant groups and of urban merchants in particular. It was from this class that the earliest jurists emerged. "The All-Embracing Town and Its Mosques" and "Servants of the Mosques" also illustrate how doctrinal change—allowing the performance of Friday Prayer in more than a single mosque in a city and allowing the payment of religious personnel—followed real social and institutional changes. "Urban Structures in the View of Muslim Jurists" shows how, in the early 19th century, Ibn 'Abidin was able to adapt the classical juristic definition of urban structures to the Damascus of his day. "Legal Literature and the Problem of Change: The Case of the Land Rent" takes a particular example of change: during the Ottoman period, the author argues, the jurists developed a new theory of rent in the commentaries and fatwa literature that recognized a category of land that existed for the purpose of renting out in order to produce an income. At the same time that they developed this idea in commentaries and fatwas, in the *mutun*, which formed the basic teaching texts, they retained intact the classical theory of rent.

Johansen's arguments are always cogent and almost always convincing. The specific topics that he discusses clearly demonstrate his major points that *fiqh* is the product of systematic reasoning, with a coherent theoretical basis, and that it remained sufficiently flexible to accommodate itself to changing circumstances. However, given the scope of the genre and its remorseless lack of cross-references, almost any generalization about the subject needs some qualification. I am not, for example, certain whether the comment is correct that the concern of the *qadi* is to judge by external evidence, while the concern of the mufti is with *diyana*, defined as "religious ethics" (pp. 185–86). The fatwas that I have read—which admittedly fall within a very narrow range—do not bear out this assertion, even though it is one that the *fuqahā* themselves make. It is certainly true that Islamic law offers the Muslim convert on Muslim territory both legal protection and "religious protection" (p. 227). It does not, however, make him the equal in all respects of the native Muslim, as becomes evident from the definitions of "equality" (*kafa'a*) in marriage. It is also certainly correct to observe that the law of homicide is distinctive in that it takes into account the "subjective intention" of the killer, not simply the external circumstances of the act (p. 432). However, it would be worth adding that the law accepts only an external indication—the use of an offensive weapon—as proof of intent. This gives rise to the problem of how to punish murder by strangling. The human hand is not an "offensive weapon," and so, in the definition of the law, the act cannot be intentional.

As a more general comment, I would certainly agree that Hanafi *fiqh* has, at the margins, shown itself responsive to changing circumstances. However, what is more striking is its extreme conservatism, and although Johansen shows admirable caution in defining the limits of the change that can be observed in the texts, this is not the case with more recent scholars, who argue against the evidence for constant evolution and change. As for the historical context of *fiqh*, I again agree that Islamic law must to some degree reflect the circumstances of its founda-

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tion, although I am less optimistic than Johansen in his observations on matters such as the origins of the legal concept of *'aqila*. The evidence is simply too nebulous. I would add, too, that *fiqh* itself is often the source not of historical fact, but of historical fiction. This is especially true of the related subjects of *jihad* and the taxation of land. This area of the law seems to have little connection to any historical reality, but it nevertheless has generated a voluminous "history" of Islamic conquest to justify both doctrine and specific tax regimes.

HASSAN S. KHALILIEH, *Islamic Maritime Law: An Introduction*, Studies in Islamic Law and Society (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998). Pp. 223. \$72.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY ANVER M. EMON, Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles

Hassan Khalilieh's work presents a broad survey of Islamic maritime law from the 9th through the 13th century. As a survey, the treatment is general and introductory; nevertheless, any reader with an interest in Islamic maritime law or medieval maritime law and practice in the Mediterranean will find this book an invaluable reference. Khalilieh argues that the Qur'an, sunna, and *fiqh* sources from the 1st and 2nd centuries (*hijra*) are generally silent on the rules of seafaring. In some of the primary documentary sources of that period, one can find the beginnings of what would become Islamic naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. But to understand the laws of seafaring, one should look to *fatawa* collections and legal texts of the 9th to 13th centuries.

Khalilieh does not limit himself to a particular legal school (*madhhab*) or Islamic sect. Rather, he relies on the legal traditions from the Sunni, Shi'i, Khariji, and Ibadi schools. However, because of his focus on the Mediterranean, Khalilieh pays special attention to the Maliki school. Further, following the method of Abraham Udovitch (*Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam*), Khalilieh uses historical sources such as Geniza documents, travel accounts, and navigational treatises to address those areas about which the legal tradition is silent. Throughout his work lies a subtle assertion of a Braudelian approach to understanding Islamic maritime law. Specifically, he suggests that Islamic maritime law may be a continuation of Mediterranean sea laws, such as the Rhodian Sea law in Justinian's *Digest*, which existed prior to Muslim dominance in the Mediterranean.

Khalilieh's work presents general descriptions of seafaring terminology and treatments of different legal issues involving shipping. He begins with a descriptive account of the technical Arabic terminology associated with seafaring. Relying on travel accounts, chronicles, and collections of *fatawa*, Khalilieh presents a typology of boats, boat equipment, and crew-member stations. For instance, at least three types of boats are reflected in the source material: *qarib* (a light boat), *markab* (small ship for the high seas), and *safina* (the largest high-seas ship, also known as *fulk*). Specialists in maritime history, as Khalilieh indicates, debate the distinctions between seafaring and riverfaring boats, a distinction found in Justinian's *Digest*. The Islamic classical sources often make this distinction, but it is not reflected in the Geniza documents or other historical sources prior to 1400. According to Khalilieh, the reason this distinction is not found in the Geniza is that the Geniza merchants are likely to have avoided the extra cost associated with transferring cargo from riverboats traveling along the Nile to seafaring boats going to ports along the Mediterranean. Thereafter, much of his discussion revolves around legal themes, such as commercial laws of ship construction; the laws of jettison, salvage, and collision; military maritime law; and so on. His treatment is broad and provides a solid overview of the topic.

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The one critique that can be directed at his work concerns his suggestion that the Islamic law of seafaring may be a continuation of a Mediterranean legal tradition of seafaring. Khali-

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lieh's heavy reliance on Maliki sources, such as Ibn Rushd's *al-Bayan wa al-Tahsil*, and on the Geniza may predispose him toward this view. However, it may also be the case that the Muslim jurists in and around the Mediterranean were responding to issues that arose from within the legal tradition. For instance, Khaled Abou El Fadl, in his work on the Islamic law of rebellion (*Rebellion in Islamic Law*), proposes the existence of a juristic culture in which jurists debate one another about the appropriate law in a given set of circumstances through the use of technical legal argument. In other words, perhaps some of the debates the jurists had with one another were driven not by historically specific maritime needs but, rather, by juridical issues that were transmitted through text and discussed among trained jurists.

For example, Khalilieh writes about the juristic debate on jettisoning human beings when a ship is in danger of sinking (p. 97). On this point he refers to jurists who were generally proximate to the Mediterranean, such as al-Qarafi (Egypt), al-Shammakhi (Tunisia), Ibn Hazm (Andalus), Qadi Iyad (Maghrib), and Sahnun (Maghrib). However, what Khalilieh does not do is determine the context in which these authors were writing. For instance, Khalilieh relies on al-Qarafi's *al-Furuq* for this point. However, *al-Furuq* is not a source of positive law; rather, it is a work of *usul al-fiqh* that addresses conceptual issues of jurisprudence. The section of *al-Furuq* on which Khalilieh relies for this issue addresses the general principle (*qa'ida*) concerning circumstances under which obligations to safeguard property terminate (*qa'ida ma la yudman*).¹ Further, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who traveled to Egypt but otherwise was born, lived, and died in Khurasan, addresses the issue of jettisoning people from a boat in his *al-Mustasfa*, again a work of *usul al-fiqh*. Although Khalilieh does refer to al-Ghazali's other works of positive law, such as *al-Wajiz*, he does not refer to *al-Mustasfa*. When al-Ghazali addresses the issue of jettisoning people from a boat in *al-Mustasfa*, he does so in the context of a discussion of *maqasid al-shari'a* and *maslaha*, not in the context of any particular treatment of shipping.²

How should one approach this point? It is not simply a question of asking which came first: Mediterranean practical needs or jurisprudential hypothesizing? Rather, the issue involves an interplay among juristic culture, jurisprudential conceptual development, positive law, and historical reality. Khalilieh ignores the role of the first two, focusing instead on the latter two, and thereby draws a nexus between them. While the jurist's historical circumstances cannot be ignored, one also cannot ignore the likelihood that jurists were in fact debating with one another on points of law and jurisprudence.

Obviously, engaging this sort of interplay is well beyond the scope of Khalilieh's work, which is intended as an introduction to the field of Islamic shipping law. Consequently, this critical point should not be understood to diminish the value of Khalilieh's contribution. Clearly, his work breaks new ground in Islamic legal studies and should be read by specialists and students alike.

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¹Shihab al-Din Abu al-Abbas ibn Idris al-Qarafi, *al-Furuq* (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1285 A.H.), 4:9.

²Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-Usul* (Egypt: al-Matba'a al-Amiriya, 1322 A.H.), 2:296.

NASIM AHMAD JAWED, *Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Predivided Pakistan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999). Pp. 309.

REVIEWED BY CRAIG BAXTER, Department of Politics (Emeritus), Juniata College, Huntingdon, Penn.

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This work is the result of a survey done in 1969 prior to the breakup of united Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The author conducted the survey among groups he categorizes as

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ulama, East Pakistani professionals, and West Pakistani professionals. The questionnaire and the results are included in appendixes.

If a thirty-year-old survey were the only basis for the book, it might be discarded quickly as fully out of date. However, to the formal survey Jawed adds the results of a large number of interviews that appear to have been less structured than the survey. He has also made what may be the most extensive study of the literature on the broad question of "Islamization" in Pakistan available in English. It is particularly valuable to have this study available in a single volume.

The survey addressed three areas: Islam and national identification, the Islamic state, and Islamic economic orientations. The tabular results of the questionnaire within the text (i.e., in addition to the extensive presentations in the appendix) are numerous. Some of them can be cited here.

On the topic of national identification, Jawed found that 81.25 percent of East Pakistani professionals could be classified as "nontraditional, wholly or partly secular," while only 60 percent of West Pakistani professionals were so classified, and 40 percent were placed in the second category of "traditional, supranational Islamic." When these categories were disaggregated according to the respondents' amount of schooling in English, the percentage of East Pakistanis in the secular group was higher, but the percentage of West Pakistanis was lower, although it still formed a majority. The East Pakistani result is hardly surprising; the reduction among West Pakistanis with more English education is somewhat surprising. The author's explanation is that, in East Pakistan, religion was viewed as "mainly a matter of personal experience," whereas in West Pakistan religion was seen as requiring "not only personal but also political and social demands" (p. 33). In other observations on this topic, secularism dominates in the East and Islamic identity in the West among professionals. Among the ulama, Islamic identity is all but unanimous.

In further explanation of the differences between East and West Pakistan, Jawed notes that the introduction of Islam in Bengal came with Sufi preachers who arrived before the military and political hold of the Delhi dynasties had been fully established. In contrast, military and political control of West Pakistan was established contemporaneously with the arrival of Islam. He cites as well the extensive use of Urdu as a language of religion—"legalistic Islam"—as the use of Arabic and Persian declines, suggesting that Bengali was far less used (pp. 29–31).

Answers to the question of whether Pakistan should again be an Islamic state displays sharp differences between East and West Pakistanis. As to the simple question of whether an Islamic state is "desirable," all of the ulama said yes, as did 68 percent of West Pakistani professionals, whereas 83.3 percent of East Pakistanis said it was not desirable. Both groups of professionals supported the concept that the purpose of the state was "social justice, interest of the working class" (p. 58). This, of course, is reflected in the importance given to secularism in the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh.

The chapter on the state also contains useful discussion of the role of democracy, equality under the law, and the form of an Islamic government. This discussion draws from the survey and from the literature of scholars such as Iqbal, Mawdudi, Fazlur Rahman, and Mufti Muhammad Shafi, as the questions of the nature of the Pakistani state and the role of Islam were discussed at the state's inception and during the Ayub, Zulfikar Bhutto, and Zia ul-Haq periods. The passing of the "shari'a bill" by the lower house of the Pakistani Parliament during the second Nawaz Sharif government occurred too late for inclusion in the book.

The question of an economic system for Pakistan also highlights differences between East and West. On the basic question as to whether the state should have a "free," "mixed," or "socialist" economy, the ulama preferred a free economy. By a slight margin, West Pakistani professionals also preferred a free economy over the mixed variety, and the East Pakistani

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professionals plumped for a socialist economy. Again, socialism was one of the “pillars” of the first government in Bangladesh.

It is evident that Jawed has gone well beyond his 1969 survey. Valuable to the reader are his discussions of the development of Islamic issues from the beginning of Islam, citing not only the Qur’an and hadith, but also major Islamic scholars throughout Islamic history. He also makes reference to developments in other Muslim-majority countries.

The book might well serve as required reading in a course on Islam and surely as additional reading in a more general course on religion and politics.

ANN MOSELY LESCH, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press; and Oxford: James Currey, 1998). Pp. 299. \$39.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY SONDRHA HALE, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles

With nearly a half-century of intermittent civil war in the background, it is becoming impossible to write a social-science monograph about Sudan without referring to contested national, ethnic, and religious identities. Few such works are gendered, however, and perhaps even fewer attempt a class analysis. Sudanese scholars contend more successfully with class; Euroamericans with gender. Despite good intentions, Sudan is usually explored through the binary model of “north” and “south.” Ann Lesch is no exception, but her ability to complicate matters is a welcome addition to the “integration–segregation” or “unionist–separatist” literature on Sudan.

Lesch’s study of contemporary Sudan is organized in a rather conventional way that entails a chronological background with the usual periodization leading up to the regime of Jaffar Nimeiri (1969–85), the brief democratic period (1985–89), and the current situation under the Islamist government. Of these three parts, the one on the current “period” is by far the most informative, partly because the material is so new, but also because Lesch knows it so well.

Before Lesch attempts to subdue the complicated current political situation and offer hopeful predictions, she marches us through the compulsory historical drill that follows colonial lines—that is “Turkiyya” (1821–85); the “Mahdiyya” (1885–98); and the “Anglo–Egyptian Condominium” (1898–1956). That the “south” cannot be so neatly periodized along the same lines requires, then, subsections that reveal the dynamics between the rest of the country and the “south.” It is only later in the book that Lesch illuminates the particular nature of southern fragmentation and elements of complicity.

Because ethnic identity is important to her analysis, Lesch lays out two views of ethnic identity: Edward Shils’s version and the “contrasting view” (e.g., John Armstrong and Ernst Renan). It is not entirely clear where her own ideas fall (pp. 4–5), and, in fact, this whole section might have been dispensed with. She seems to reject too much “imagining” (in reference to Benedict Anderson) as a “voluntarist” concept and opts for Anthony Smith’s work. She first contrasts ethnic and territorial nationalism (pp. 6–7), then the “control model” of rule to a “pluralist model” (pp. 8–9), after which she presents a brief discussion of self-determination and secession (pp. 12–15). Having established this theoretical matrix, she does not link it clearly and directly to Sudan. The reader is to assume that the brief section, “The Contested Sudanese Nation-State,” is the link (pp. 21–24).

Before introducing the data for her central arguments, Lesch does what all Sudanist social scientists feel compelled to do—develop a section on the “ethnic composition of the Sudan” (pp. 15–19). Hers is more innovative than some; it is a brave undertaking that contains mistakes or over-generalizations (e.g., referring to Nubians as “non-Arabized”; p. 17). One also wonders

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whether anyone Lesch talked with actually identified himself or herself as “African” (p. 3), just as one might ask whether it is legitimate to refer to the “south” as “Christian and other” (p. 3).

Like most Sudanists, Lesch neatly divides people into ethnic categories, then proceeds to totalize “the south” and “the north” in order to develop an explanatory model. Next she presents an adequate, if conventional, historical survey, a too-brief exploration of British colonial policy, and the significant Juba Conference that was to establish the future of the “south” and reveal some of the attitudes undergirding the relentless civil war.

Lesch’s writing contains the flaw of attributing thoughts and attitudes to entire groups of people and using these as explanations for political events. For example, she writes, “They [Arab–Islamic people of the north] assumed that non-Arab and non-Muslim peoples lacked cultural . . . identities of their own.” This is then referred to as the “assimilationist model” (p. 44). Or, “This fierce confrontation [Nimeiri and opposition groups in the mid-1970s] seemed to shock both sides into realizing that they could not destroy each other” (p. 52). No documents are quoted; too few of the actors speak for themselves, except the statement by Saddig al-Mahdi, the Ansar–Sufi–sectarian leader of the Umma Party: “The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab” (p. 42). Too often, Sudanese and Sudanists give Saddig and Mohammad Osman al-Mirghani, the Khatmi–Sufi–sectarian leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the power to speak for all of the north. Sudan scholars imbue them with a hegemonic power that could just as easily be subverted by the expression of other northern actors: members of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), trade unionists, members of professional unions, and northern Christians. Perhaps the attitudes would average out the same, but we cannot know.

In Chapter 4, Lesch aptly expresses the oscillating, often contradictory regime of Nimeiri that began with some promise for the south and others and ended in an authoritarianism that alienated even northerners. Nimeiri’s regime could initially be categorized as “secular, socialist, and pan-Arab, modeled on the Nasirite revolution in Egypt” (p. 45). Nimeiri was the force behind the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that was to give to the south both proportional representation in the central government and a quasi-federal system. In practice, however, the promised system never got off the ground. Nimeiri’s right, left, and center, and north–south manipulations undermined the agreement, and the war resumed.

Lesch is at her strongest in the early chapters, when she is relating the maneuvering over resources and behind-the-scenes wrangling—for example, over oil (p. 48). Although I agree that the wrangling over resources was a significant feature of Nimeiri’s regime (e.g., the “scent of oil” in the south), two other processes warrant longer and more complex treatment: (1) the subversion and shattering of the military command by Nimeiri, resulting in the consolidation of power in the hands of the security forces (p. 54); and (2) the creeping success of Hasan al-Turabi, Saddig’s brother-in-law, whose Islamic Charter Front was a forerunner to the National Islamic Front (NIF). The slide from Sufi-based Umma and DUP to full-blown Islamism, the desecularization of the military and civil service, and the metamorphosis of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*) to NIF are all powerful transformations that need more complete exploration. Likewise, what does the dynamic transformation or schism from Anya-Nya (the first successful southern guerilla movement) to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) mean?

The Sudan is an example of a book that gets better with each succeeding chapter. Starting with Part II (“The Democratic Period, 1985–1989”), the reader is treated to a complex analysis of the dynamics of Sudanese politics—including the breakdown of democracy under Saddig; the rise of the NIF; 1980s efforts to resolve the civil war and the prominence and dominance of the SPLM in that process and in the war; the political options for the south; the role of Christian institutions and the increasing “indoctrination and control” by Islamists (here, Lesch deals with women in one page), including the formation of Islamic militias, the power of the

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security forces, the building of Islamic institutions, and the Islamists' control over education and information.

By chapter 9 ("The Fragmented Opposition"), after building an image of a formidable Islamist regime, Lesch presents an excellent portrait of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), first as an umbrella opposition force within Sudan and, in the end, as an unlikely assemblage of disaffected groups in exile. Like most contemporary political studies, this book needs a running epilogue. As of this writing, Saddig, the former prime minister, has bolted from the ever-bickering NDA, unable to share power with John Garang, leader of the SPLM/A. At least part of the Umma Party has returned to Sudan to form a coalition with the Islamist government, from which Saddig's politics, admittedly, had never strayed far. A new epilogue is needed.

Lesch's Conclusion should have been the Introduction, replacing the binary models set forth. In this last chapter, she problematizes ethnicity ("Identities are not immutable"; p. 211), highlights intragroup differences, questions the hegemony of Islam, subverts the concepts of "north" and "south," and introduces NDA ideas about redefinition and realignment. An appendix on "The Changing Composition of Governments" is a gift to the informed student of Sudanese politics. To the discerning reader it can reveal ethnicity, region, party affiliation and ideology, power shifts, and military power. One also welcomes the Index and useful Bibliography.

Lesch's highly valuable book might have benefitted from an observation of the subtle NIF shift from a dominant Arab-Islamic identity to an Islamic one, making recruitment seem less intrusive, perhaps less racist, and allowing female Islamist ideologues the option to blame Arabs for their past inequality. Such a shift in national identity is a definite challenge to the Arab-Islamic-laden Umma Party. One would also have welcomed more analysis of international capital and globalization and the links to the Sudanese economy and politics.

The Sudan is destined to be an indispensable source for political analyses of late-20th-century Sudan.

HISHAM M. NAZER, *Power of a Third Kind: The Western Attempt to Colonize the Global Village* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 176.

REVIEWED BY CHERYL A. RUBENBERG, Department of Political Science, Florida International University, Miami

Hisham Nazer, chairman of the Nazer Group of Saudi Arabia, former minister of planning, former minister of petroleum, and chairman of Saudi Aramco, has written a powerful and provocative book. In this highly original tour de force, Nazer analyzes the deleterious effects of the technological globalization of information on the cultural integrity of Third World nations and sets forth a strategy of resistance for the developing world. The work is directed at intellectuals in these countries, whom he challenges to "not just exist in this world; [but to] create our own world." Rejecting the narrow definition of culture as "object-focused" acts and artifacts, he argues that culture should be understood as "the collective and dynamically active perspectives of living individuals."

In this context, Nazer rails against the blind, complacent, or co-opted acceptance by the Third World of the symbolic use by the West of such ethnocentric politicized concepts as "market democracy," "environmental protection," and "human rights." Indeed, not only does Nazer demonstrate the subjectivity and intentionality of such terms; he illustrates how they have become merely fetishized commodities, packaged and used by the West—in particular, the United States—to "universalize Western culture" and promote the "veracity of liberal individualism" across the globe. In short, Nazer argues that the United States is employing the new "power of a third kind" to preclude all cultural diversity that might interfere with its quest

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to colonize the globe in the service of its political and economic interests. Moreover, he notes, "Because the West sees its culture as fundamental to being human, the question of separating politics from their culture does not arise." At the same time, Nazer argues, by dominating and molding international discourse, the United States is forcing non-Western countries to separate politics from culture so as to "exclude conflict over culture." The consequences for the developing world are stark:

Take human rights, for example. If a nation or group of nations successfully sells a definition of human rights that reflects their particular culture and political system, they have created a basis of rage in advance of their predictable need to stretch the envelope of acceptable actions. Then, when human rights violations become a justification for isolating a nation, the basis of rage falls easily on those outside the definition they have created. This means that hegemony has moved from a nation's ability to *make* the rules to their ability to *validate* how well others adhere to the rules.

Nazer believes, however, that if Third World intellectuals make an attempt to apprehend this new marketing campaign for what it is, they can employ the same global information technology in the still open global "spaces" to develop alternative responses. He is roundly calling for a campaign of counter-power to facilitate a non-Western dialogue for a re-codification of human rights and freedoms derived "from the rich diversity of all cultures" and to create "minimum standards governing the appropriate conditions of international intervention."

The book is at once scholarly and polemical in the sense of rejecting Western models and discourses and arguing for a different vision and a new politics of choice that allows multiple visions from multiple cultures. It succeeds admirably at both. *Power of a Third Kind* is a powerful and provocative analysis, firmly grounded in the sociology of knowledge and in an intimate understanding of the relationship between power and knowledge. Using extensive academic sources from several disciplines, Nazer skillfully deconstructs hegemonic Western paradigms, beginning with the scientific method that reduced all "knowledge" to that which could be replicated and quantified and effectively discredited all spiritual, metaphysical, speculative, intuitive, creative, and other ways of knowing. From there, he illustrates that it was a short step to Western intellectuals' "scientizing" the study of politics, cultures, and societies and giving birth to a utilitarian "social science." Once social science became legitimated as science, "bureaucratized intellectuals" were co-opted into the service of American foreign policy. Western intellectuals "created knowledge about knowing, identified that knowledge with the physicality of Nature, and then applied its premises and criteria to all previously accepted ways of knowing about human experience. . . . [S]cientism, as a philosophy and a way of thinking, continues to be transcendent, [and] only 'scientifically' derived conclusions are readily given credibility in most matters of social, political, and economic import."

It is in these terms that Nazer analyzes how American intellectuals and U.S. policy-makers determined what constituted "progress," defined "traditional" versus "modern," prescribed "growth by stages," and punished dissenters who chose not to conform. (One is reminded of Vietnam and Guatemala, to mention only the most obvious.) More recently, Nazer points out, the West has declared the "end of history," delineated the "clash of civilizations," and transformed non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from marginal "do-gooders" to vital and integral parts of the foreign-policy establishment. Anyone who doubts the last assertion need only look at who funds the NGOs and analyze their agendas.

Nazer makes the important and relevant point that power exerted by the most powerful nations "is curvilinear in terms of effectiveness and vertical in terms of resultant counterpower." While acknowledging that both the technology and human capacity to use electronic communications to colonize global perceptions are at present under Western control, he rightly argues that the world is in a delicate transition period. He observes that Western elites have not yet successfully established a global "consensus" and that the achievement of such objectives is

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the most important challenge facing the West. For this very reason, Nazer believes that non-Western nations have a window of opportunity in “the dynamic space between the exertion of power and the realization of counterpower” to alter the site, substance, and participatory levels of global discourse.

The unease of Western “bureaucratized intellectuals” concerning the possibilities that other nations may insert themselves in the yet-uncolonized open spaces can be found in a multiplicity of venues. One notable example is Thomas L. Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999). Friedman is primarily concerned about the economic inequalities that result from “Americanism–globalization [sic]” and the likelihood that the new global class system may lead to a “backlash” from the dispossessed majority. When considering the Middle East, however, Friedman’s anxieties expand from the resentments of economic victims to potential cultural “threats” from an “Islamic fundamentalist” backlash. Friedman, of course, is incapable of conceptualizing any ground between acceptance of Western rationalism and terrorist–Islamic fundamentalism. Tellingly, the Ramzi Yousef story is a central example of his concerns. Friedman writes:

Where this cultural backlash becomes the most politically destabilizing is when it gets married to one of the other backlashes—when groups that are economically aggrieved by globalization merge with those who are culturally aggrieved. This phenomenon is most apparent in the Middle East, where fundamentalists of many stripes have become highly adept at weaving the cultural, political and economic backlashes against globalization into one flag and one broad political movement that seeks to take power and pull down a veil against the world [Friedman 1999, 280].

Friedman continues his discussion of the Middle East by relating the story of a young, female Kuwaiti environmental-health scientist who was educated in the United States, wears the *jilbaab*, and runs the most popular Internet cafe in Kuwait City. He tells her frankly, “Look, I’m a little confused. . . . You are obviously a religious person, but you were educated in an American university and now you are bringing the Internet to Kuwait. I don’t quite see how it all adds up.” Her reply encapsulates Friedman’s and other Western intellectuals’ anxiety: “[S]o many times in the past the Arab–Islamic world ha[s] been invaded by outsiders, with their often alien influences and technologies. . . . [We] are being invaded again. But this time [we] are going to own that invasion, not let the invasion own [us] (ibid., 290). Friedman’s worst fears are precisely what Nazer is calling for.

For some in the “West,” Nazer’s ideas are not new—Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, and others have written of such issues in various contexts. Such thinkers, of course, are not bureaucratized intellectuals or, as Chomsky calls them, the “secular priesthood,” and they have no influence on American foreign policy. The majority does indeed believe that their “knowledge” is The Truth. Interestingly, it is from science itself—particle physics, quantum mechanics, etc.—that the original “scientific truths” have been turned on their heads. Unfortunately, the insights from the new science have yet to filter down to policy-making “social scientists.” Nevertheless, such a critique from the perspective of a “Third World” intellectual is quite unusual. It is also refreshing and inspiring.

I agree with Nazer’s analysis of co-opted Western intellectuals; America’s “exceptionalist” foreign policy; and the internationalism, commodification, and fetishization of “democracy,” “environmentalism,” “human rights,” and other Western conceptual yardsticks used to distinguish economic “friends” from “rogue states.” The latter, they hold, deserve annihilation by high-tech weapons, starvation by sanctions and embargoes, or some other designated punishment. Yet, I could not help thinking as I read this treatise: is this really a plea for cultural integrity, pluralism, and a release from Western hegemony? Or is it an apology for a cultural relativity that perhaps reflects only the values of a part of its society? One might wish that the culture from which the writer comes were somewhat more inclusive.

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In her eminently balanced book on the quality of women's lives in Saudi Arabia, *Women in Saudi Arabia Today* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), Mona Al-Munajjed writes: "[a]s a member of this society and sharing Saudi women's ideas, beliefs and personal experiences, I am able to understand the influence of cultural, traditional and patriarchal values on their status" (Al-Munajjed 1997, 6–7). After extensive interviews with a cross-section of Saudi women on issues ranging from segregation and the veil to education and work, Al-Munajjed concludes that, although there have been considerable positive changes in women's lives, these changes are "limited by obstacles pertaining to local traditions, norms, patriarchal values and social beliefs" (ibid., 104). Finally, she writes: "What is needed, then, is a restructuring of thought and analysis that accepts the fact that women are equal to men and provides the vital element for the development of today's society. It is essential to recognize the fact that Islamic values are not an impediment to the participation of women in the building of the country, and that cultural constraints placed on women should be gradually cleared away through education and public enlightenment" (ibid., 107). Indeed, nowhere in Nazer's treatise do women appear as part of his hope for "developing nations' intellectuals."

If Saudi Arabia evidenced the spiritual and ethical characteristics of a society reflecting, for example, the Islam articulated by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, I would be less skeptical about Nazer's intentions. Here, I am recalling especially Nasr's *Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man* (Chicago: ABC International Group, 1997) and *Knowledge and the Sacred* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). I profoundly believe that the West should open itself to the values, traditions, ways of knowing, and cultures and societies of the East. We have lost our humanity to a culture of commodization and materialism. We might yet be saved through the wisdom and spirituality of the Buddha, the *Tao Te Ching*, Martin Buber's *I and Thou*, the original teachings and knowledge from Muhammad and Jesus, and the connections with nature that the shamans have communicated from so many different places on globe. I am not convinced, however, that this is the sort of world Nazer really wants.

Be that as it may, and given the ethnocentric inequality and hegemonic intentionality inherent in America's global agenda, I support counter-power of whatever sort. I would, however, suggest a different strategy to Nazer. Instead of publishing in English through a mainstream U.S. corporation, produce this book in Arabic and distribute it to every literate Arab individual—male and female—from high-school students to heads of state. I have spent the past twenty-five years interacting with "ordinary" Arabs (not intellectuals or officials), and in my experience, all understand—intuitively and experientially—the oppressive and negative aspects of Pax Americana. They also feel betrayed by their own leaders and intellectuals. The Arab masses outside "officialdom" (be it political, economic, or intellectual) may lack Nazer's sophistication in articulating that culturally and humanly corrosive power, but given the tools—books, computers, a pedagogy that teaches independent and critical thought, and authentic organic leadership—their creative potential is limitless. Nazer could provide all that. Then, led by an invigorated Arab-Islamic world, other Third World cultures and countries would have the models and inspiration to chart their own courses.

URI BIALER, *Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–63* (London: Macmillan; and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). Pp. 289.

REVIEWED BY MARY ANN TÉTREAULT, Department of Political Science, Trinity University, San Antonio, Tex.

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Pressures to lift economic sanctions against Iraq and Iran make studies of such sanctions, along with other restraints on investment and commerce, welcome additions to the political-economy

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literature. Uri Bialer's book is a diplomatic history of the effects of the Arab League boycott on Israeli oil supplies and the countermeasures Israel took to overcome them. The story he tells is powerful, and it has made me rethink carefully my former position on economic sanctions. This highly sympathetic consideration of Israel's difficult situation under sanctions reveals the extent to which desperation lowers inhibitions against actions that might have been disdained by policy-makers facing happier choices. Perhaps the ultimate irony is that this story shows that even when sanctions are operationally effective, they rarely achieve the strategic goals the initiators had in mind; indeed, sanctions are more likely to work at crosspurposes to those goals.

In an article on the Arab boycott published in these pages nearly thirty years ago, Don Losman concentrated primarily on operational effectiveness in his assessment of its impact. His consideration of the boycott's strategic effects was done primarily in terms of opportunity costs to Israelis and Arabs from the application of economic sanctions. Losman reminds us that, at first, these sanctions were two-sided. They began in the late 1930s, when Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs each restricted economic relations with the other. As the Jewish position in Palestine strengthened following the end of World War II, the new Arab League attempted to counter by imposing a boycott on "Zionist produce" in 1946. In 1949, these sanctions were expanded to include all commercial dealings with the new State of Israel (Donald L. Losman, "The Arab Boycott of Israel," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1 [1972]: 100, 107).

Perhaps the most severe direct impact of the boycott on Israel was felt with respect to fuel. With no significant indigenous supplies, Israel was dependent on imports. Crude was refined at facilities in Haifa owned by Consolidated Refineries Ltd. (CRL), a joint venture of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC; now BP) and Royal Dutch Shell. Along with Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Socony Vacuum (Mobil), and the French national oil company CFP, they were major shareholders in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), whose oil flowed via pipeline from Mosul not only to Haifa, which also received crude by tanker from other sources, but also to Tripoli, Lebanon. The fuel-supply problem encompassed both supply security—where Israel's oil would come from—and its cost.

The total cost of fuel to Palestine was high even before the boycott. With respect to indirect costs, CRL enjoyed substantial tax breaks under preferential regulation by Britain, the Mandatory power in Palestine (p. 13). Monopolistic practices contributed directly to high crude and product prices. The half-hearted exploration for oil reserves in Palestine had been influenced by the "Red Line" agreement among the IPC partners to limit the development in production capacity in territories, such as Palestine, that formerly were governed by the Ottoman Empire. Prices were rigged via cartel arrangements initiated in 1928 that eventually extended to eighteen European and U.S. oil companies. Included were provisions for protecting local market shares of established firms, crude-price fixing, and freight-cost equalization, the latter two based on the highest-cost oil traded internationally. Ironically, by the time the Arab boycott went into effect, oil-transportation costs rarely included "phantom freight" charges. Freight costs were real, magnifying the effects of the refusal of nearby Arab League countries such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia to sell oil to Israel and Egypt's refusal to allow tankers carrying crude destined for Israel to take the shortcut to Haifa through the Suez Canal.

The refinery also was a bone of contention. The Israelis had taken "physical control" of it during the 1948 war. They requisitioned oil supplies on-site and also tried to make crude purchases from Romania and Russia to keep the refinery running, but operations had to be halted for lack of raw materials because Iraq would not permit the IPC to deliver crude to Haifa. The Israelis' seizures of plant and materiel, and efforts to arrange for crude deliveries independent of the oil companies already established in the Palestine/Israel market made the refinery owners fear that the new state intended to nationalize their properties. This affected their sympathies

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for Israel. Shell, which had a reserve of 10,000 tons of fuel oil “laid down . . . for the Israeli government” later withheld it (p. 54).

The oil companies and the Arab states were not the only ones concerned about the fate of the refinery and its associated storage and trans-shipment facilities. Other governments, along with the United Nations, added to the interests seeking accommodation. A U.N. commission suggested internationalizing Haifa and the refinery area so that, technically, it would not be part of Israel, and therefore operations could continue as before. Another “technical” solution was offered by the French. Some of the IPC crude traveling through the pipeline to Haifa went to Europe. The French hoped to get Iraq to resume sending crude destined for Europe through Haifa by guaranteeing that none of it would be refined in Israel. The United States and U.S.-based oil companies preferred to close the Haifa facilities and supply the region from newer (mostly U.S.-owned) refineries already under construction or completed. Britain wished to restart the refinery, but also offered to guarantee the delivery of products to Israel if crude supplies were insufficient—provided that there was no renewal of hostilities between Arabs and Jews. The Israelis wanted more control over the refinery and what it produced, along with guaranteed supplies of cheap crude to run through it. They also wanted the United States, France, and Britain to take their part and do a little strong-arming of Iraq (and Egypt).

When Iraq persisted in its refusal to send IPC crude to Haifa through the pipeline, the transportation problem became critical. Not only was the cheapest option foreclosed, but Arab League sanctions also included a secondary boycott, which, among other measures, blacklisted tankers that brought crude to Israel from docking at Arab ports and also denied them future passage through the Suez Canal. Finding sources of crude willing to sell to Israel and close enough to minimize transportation costs presented constant difficulties. A wide range of deceptive practices were adopted to conceal the destination of Eastern Hemisphere crude carried for Israeli use, but most such arrangements only added to the crude’s cost and their ad hoc quality left Israel vulnerable to unpredictable shifts in sources of supply.

Given the difficulty in purchasing cargoes that had traveled through the Suez Canal, the ideal solution for the Israelis was to bring Persian Gulf crude up the Red Sea into Eilat, on the Gulf of Aqaba. However, as long as Egypt controlled the Straits of Tiran, it could—and did—interdict Israeli shipping in and out of Eilat. Although Bialer does not discuss Israel’s participation in the 1956 Suez war in as much depth as the conflict with IPC, it is clear that Israeli plans for industrial development in Eilat, which included building a pipeline to send crude landed there to Haifa to be refined, was a deciding factor in its decision to join France and Britain in invading Egypt (p. 220). As war booty, Israel captured equipment and supplies from Sinai to construct the Eilat–Haifa pipeline that it otherwise would have had to purchase from foreign manufacturers. The success of the Eilat development project was assured after Israel received U.S. diplomatic support for its claim to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Suez war aggravated relations among Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, prompting the CRL to consider abandoning the Haifa refinery. Its parent companies, AIOC and Shell, already were targets of Arab pressure for their continued involvement with the refinery and for supplying crude and products to Israel. (For a short time, some of this oil actually came from Kuwait and Qatar, countries that were British dependencies and therefore not members of the Arab League.) Technical factors also influenced this decision. The Haifa refinery, which was small and technologically outmoded, experienced recurring operating losses at the same time that continuing to run it put the parent companies’ lucrative investments in Arab oil production at risk. Adding to the unattractiveness of remaining in the Israeli market, the companies were repeatedly embroiled in conflicts with the government. Getting out seemed the best way to deal with all these difficulties.

The Suez crisis, along with the closure of the canal, disrupted oil supply lines and increased prices worldwide. Israel’s quest to find alternative sources of crude and products also was

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affected. Prior to the Suez war, the Israelis had contracts with the Soviet Union for deliveries of crude and fuel oil. These were canceled from the Soviet side when Israel joined the attack on Egypt. By then, however, Israel had found an even better source: Iran. Israel had approached Iran in 1949 when Iran was aligned politically with its Arab neighbors and not inclined to pursue commercial relations with Israel. In 1951, Iran came to Israel as a potential customer who might be willing to defy sanctions imposed by Britain and the United States in response to the decision of the Mossadeq government to nationalize BP's Iranian properties. This time, Israel was the reluctant partner, but after the reorganization of the National Iranian Oil Company to include a number of small U.S.-based firms, it was able to contract for Iranian oil with companies that did not have other Middle Eastern interests that could be compromised by taking it as a customer. Israel also enjoyed the support of the U.S. government in forging this new trade relationship (p. 178). Iranian crude soon became a mainstay of the Israeli supply chain. "By early 1959 . . . between five and six crude oil cargoes per month were reaching Eilat from Iran" (p. 242).

These and other tactical successes in evading the boycott are the primary focus of Bialer's account. Yet, in the end, he concludes that Israel's oil security was mortgaged to schemes with little long-term potential, a pattern initiated and institutionalized during the period of his study. His Epilogue echoes the general sentiment of Losman's 1972 article, which was filled with regret for the development opportunities everyone lost as a result of the Arab boycott. While Bialer does not share Losman's interest in the economic development of the Arab states, he deeply regrets the loss of options for Israel caused by the boycott. Yet although it is obvious that the boycott interfered with Israel's economic-development plans, it is clear from Bialer's study that, in many instances, the Israelis added to their own problems. He shows them as mistrustful, repeatedly refusing to compromise, trying to play other actors against one another, and insisting on favorable treatment they were not willing to reciprocate—behavior they could get away with because of the objective difficulties of their situation.

This is a very detailed book on a fascinating subject, and there is much here to interest the careful reader. At the same time, the details often are overwhelming, and the reader is not well served by the way they are presented. The story is told chronologically, but even with chapter summaries, it is difficult to recollect the identities of minor players briefly encountered scores of pages earlier or to get a coherent picture of policy stretching beyond minutely reported individual incidents. I found myself alternately longing for the assistance of Homeric epithets, then regretting that wish because one of the few epithets used was inaccurate and misleading. Throughout the book Bialer refers to "Shell" as "the British company." There is some degree to which this is true—and that degree is about 40 percent. The firm to which the epithet "the British company" actually corresponds is AIOC/BP. Bialer's indiscriminate use of "the British company" for both Shell and BP elides the frequent conflicts of interest between them (some of which *are* reflected in the text), aids in the inaccurate conflation of corporate and state interests, and allows him to ignore Holland entirely as an interested principal.

The volume also suffers from the absence of any discernable thesis to frame the narrative or to create categories for comparison. The index offers only a partial roadmap for readers interested in working things out for themselves, because so many entries—examples include "Shell oil company," "IPC," and "Iran"—have no subheadings. Connecting the dots on a particular role or activity involving those actors becomes tedious, at best. Another problem is that the primary sources grounding this study are limited almost entirely to Israeli, U.S., and British government archives. Although the author makes occasional evaluative remarks, they are grounded neither in a normative or analytical framework of his own nor in a comparison of primary or secondary sources whose understanding and interpretation of events differ from those of the principals whose actions he is discussing.

As an analytical treatment of the place of oil in the Arab–Israeli conflict, this book leaves

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something to be desired. Even so, it brings together valuable information on this critical period in the development of the Israeli political economy. By far its greatest contribution lies in the many examples it provides of the perverse consequences of economic sanctions. Not only do these unfortunate repercussions affect those imposing the sanctions—the usual focus of academic cautionary tales on this topic—but they also degrade the target, often depicted as “getting away” with whatever it did to evoke the sanctions in the first place. Yet as this book shows very well, the harm arising from “effective” sanctions is darker and more complicated than any list of lost opportunities. The target, forced to adapt to intentional deprivation, reacts like a victim able to justify almost any course of action taken to ensure survival under the sanctions regime. In consequence, the ecology of the conflict between the parties deteriorates in unforeseen ways. “Adjustment” elicits devious behavior and attracts unsavory bedfellows. It privileges the short run over the long run and thereby prevents the cultivation of transparency and reciprocity, building blocks of the trust necessary for “normal” international relations. As we contemplate the contribution of economic sanctions to the consolidation of clerical control over post-Revolutionary Iran and to the stranglehold Saddam continues to exercise over Iraq, we also should consider the siege mentality that economic sanctions reinforced and expanded among Israelis. From this vantage point, it is not surprising to find among the legacies of the Arab boycott a deficit among Israelis and their neighbors in the confidence necessary for all of them together to achieve a durable peace. Decades from now, new books may tell a similar story about the progress of conflict resolution in the Gulf.

MARTIN GILBERT, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996). Pp. 428. \$16.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY PHILIP MATTAR, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C.

Much has been written about Jerusalem since the Madrid peace conference in 1991, most of it by partisans on both sides. Sir Martin Gilbert’s work is one of the most entertaining, but least objective. Gilbert is a fellow of Merton College, Oxford University, and a biographer of Sir Winston Churchill and historian of World War II. He begins where his earlier volume, *Jerusalem: Rebirth of a City*, ended—around the turn of the 20th century. He starts his story with the last few years of Ottoman rule; dwells on British rule (1917–48) and the 1948 war; skims over the years between 1948 and 1967, especially the Jordanian rule of East Jerusalem; then gives a long account of the years after 1967. He ends his book with an endorsement of a plan to return part of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Gilbert is a master of the art of compressing an enormous amount of materials about the city’s social, architectural, cultural, religious, and political history during the past century into a compelling and readable narrative. His book thus provides a panoramic account of the city, and, because he relies on newspapers, it has an eyewitness quality to it.

Unfortunately, Gilbert’s tale is one-sided. He implies that modernization started after the first wave of Jewish immigration, apparently unaware of the scholarly writings of Alexander Schölch and others that show the extent of modernization and integration into the world economic system that occurred especially during the 1860s and 1870s. He claims that “more Arabs [about 300,000] had emigrated to Palestine than Jews” between 1922 and 1939. A journalist, Joan Peters, made a similar claim in 1984, but within a year credible scholars had debunked it as a fabrication. Gilbert’s accounts of the violent disturbances in Palestine during British rule are closer to those of the Jewish Agency than to the British commission reports, of which he is unaware or which he ignores.

He demonstrates an equal imbalance in writing about the contemporary period. For example, he portrays Teddy Kollek, mayor of Jerusalem (1965–93), as improving areas in East Jerusa-

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lem, apparently unaware that Jerusalem's deputy mayor, Meron Benvenisti, among others, has written a revisionist account that depicts the mayor as having neglected and discriminated against the Palestinians of East Jerusalem, and, through various measures, having limited their population to 28 percent. He also claims that Palestinian Christians are leaving because of "Muslim hostility" (p. xii), whereas their exodus has more to do with socio-economic factors and the consequences of the conflict.

There are numerous other questionable conclusions and errors. For instance, Gilbert states that Sir Herbert Samuel, first high commissioner for Palestine (1920–25), was "a Jew but not a Zionist" (p. 43), even though Samuel was one of the earliest advocates of the Jewish National Home and was Chaim Weizmann's choice for the post. Kamil al-Husayni was not the "Mufti of Jerusalem" (p. 59) but the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Amin al-Husayni was not the "fomenter" (p. 84) of the 1920 riots, nor does the Palin report "confirm" that he was. The Western (Wailing) Wall riots took place not in "1928 and 1929" (p. 342) but in August of 1929 only. The Mufti of Jerusalem did not "establish the Arab Higher Committee" (p. 147). The Haganah was not a bystander during the attack on Dayr Yasin on 9 April 1948; it consented, though reluctantly, according to the historian Benny Morris, to the Irgun and Stern attack on the village, which cost the lives of about 100, not 254, Palestinians. There are dozens of these errors, and they leave the impression that Gilbert is unfamiliar with the scholarly history of Jerusalem.

He is also selective in his use of data. To personalize the deaths of the victims of violence in Jerusalem, he provides some moving details of their lives and deaths. In a chapter about the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, which he calls "The Riots of 1936 and Their Aftermath," there are numerous brief statements about those killed in the violence: "forty-six year old Rabbi Reuben Kloppholtz left a widow and eight children," and about another, "his widow was expecting their first child." (p. 141). Most of the descriptions, however, are about Jewish victims, even though the death count during the revolt, according to Gilbert, was 3,000 Palestinians, 500 Jews, and 150 Britons. In another chapter, about the last five months of British rule (January through May 1948), he provides numerous brief accounts of civilian deaths. Quoting a Jewish journalist about a dying friend: "Such beautiful golden hair . . . such beautiful hair . . . full of blood" (p. 197). Describing the deaths of two doctors killed in the Hadasah convoy massacre of 17 April 1948, Gilbert devotes two paragraphs to L. Doljansky, who was a pioneer in medicine and "an excellent pianist;" and to Dr. Yassky, who was the "doyen of medicine in Palestine" and who "treated several thousand Arabs of trachoma" (p. 205). These descriptions are pertinent because they highlight the tragedy and senselessness of the violence of 1948. But the vast majority of such details in this chapter (and throughout the book) are about Jewish victims, even though Gilbert ends the chapter citing the death toll between January and May 1948 as 3,569 Palestinians, 1,256 Jews, and 152 Britons.

Part of Gilbert's problem is that he relies almost exclusively on Jewish and pro-Zionist sources, such as the *Palestine Post*. Of the 197 sources in the bibliography, only six were written by Arabs: a speech by Jordan's King Hussein in 1995, a general book on the Middle East by Albert Hourani, a book by Walid Khalidi about Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948, a book of essays by Edward Said, and two minor articles. No Palestinian Arabic newspapers, such as *Filastin*, are cited; neither are memoirs and histories, of which there are dozens, mostly in Arabic but also in English. Indeed, no archives are cited—not even the voluminous Public Record Office, which is an hour away from Oxford, or the invaluable commission reports that are far more balanced and detailed than Jewish, or Arab, sources.

This is a readable popular history of Jerusalem but one that is flawed by errors and bias. As one reviewer, Marshal J. Berger, described it, Gilbert "reinforces the standard Zionist view that when it comes to Israel, the Jews earned it by the labor of their hand and the ingenuity of their spirit." It is Gilbert's attempt to reinforce this view that overwhelms his text and distorts his history of Jerusalem.

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DAVID MITTELBERG, *The Israel Connection and American Jews* (London and Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999.) Pp. 209. \$55.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY J. ALAN WINTER, Department of Sociology, Connecticut College, New London

The Israel connection whose impact on American Jews David Mittelberg examines is that engendered by a visit to Israel by an American Jew, not that of any special relationship between the nation-state of Israel and of the United States. The book's conclusions, then, are not offered with an eye toward Israeli or American foreign policy. Instead, they are offered as a possible contribution to those "formulating strategies and allocating resources which will have an impact on Jewish education and community survival" (p. 2) in the United States. Mittelberg advises those engaged in such activities that the survival of an American Jewish identity requires not only a religious component, but also an ethnic one based in a Jewish community. Moreover, that community "must choose to exist not mainly for the sake of philanthropic, social welfare, and political activities, but as an end unto itself [whose] boundaries include all of Jewish history and Jewish peoplehood" (p. 133).

The thesis of the work is that a trip to Israel "is a unique experience that connects American Jews to their past [and] to Israel's present" (p. viii). The uniqueness of a trip to Israel is, in turn, "bound up in the . . . concept of [Jewish] *peoplehood*," a concept that recognizes that for "most American Jews, being Jewish carries both religious and ethnic connotations" (p. 1; emphasis original). The main hypothesis tested is "that the Israel visit serves to increase the salience, valence, and meaning of whatever Jewish identity segments" (p. 30) one adopts.

After a discussion of Zionism in the United States and of the centrality of Israel in Jewish life in America, Mittelberg reviews the handful of previous empirical studies of who among America's Jews visits Israel and of the impact of their visits on their respective Jewish identities. These studies "indicate that a visit to Israel is positively associated with and/or responsible for" (p. 16) a stronger Jewish identity. Mittelberg's own statistical analyses are built on previous research and the cautions it offers. However, before presenting his analyses, Mittelberg provides an insightful treatment of the relationships of modernity, ethnicity, and identity among Americans in general, and among American Jews in particular.

For Mittelberg, following the insights of Berger and Luckman's *The Social Construction of Reality*, and of Berger, Berger, and Kellner's *The Homeless Mind*, one's personal ethnic identity is viewed as "endemically open, residing in an ever-secularized world of pluralized meanings" (p. 23). Consequently, American Jews—adults and youth alike, but especially the youth—have an unstable Jewish identity and are "conversion-prone" (p. 23). Within the context of modernity, the specific outcome of what Mittelberg calls "migrant ethnogenesis"—the process of forming an ethnic identity, Jewish or otherwise—is said to be a result of the interaction of three social actors: the individual migrant, society at large, and the "proximal host" (pp. 25–26). The "proximal host" is "the group that the wider society would define as the immigrants co-ethnics" (p. 26), whether the immigrant agrees or not. For example, if an immigrant population of Eastern European Jews is thought by the wider society to have German Jews as co-ethnics, or Cuban immigrants and Mexican Americans are seen as co-ethnics, then so it will be, even if the proximal host (German Jews or Mexican Americans) and the immigrant group do not care much for each other initially. In any case, Mittelberg notes that the resulting Jewish identity may, following the formulations of Herbert Gans, entail "symbolic ethnicity" or "symbolic religiosity." The former is a "limiting case" in which one is "Jewish and something else [e.g., American], rather than Jewish and nothing else" (p. 32). The latter is a form of religiosity that does not call for much by way of religious affiliation or observance (p. 33).

Unfortunately, the statistical analyses that follow make little use of the discussion of modernity, ethnicity, and identity. Indeed, the (rather scanty) index, which lists about as many names as concepts, indicates that only "symbolic ethnicity" is mentioned more than once in the discus-

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sion of data analysis. For the most part, all that remains is the use of three measures of Jewish identification: Jewish religious practices, communal affiliation, and out-marriage (or interfaith marriage). However, consideration of modernity, ethnicity, and identity do return in the two final chapters.

The main data source for this study is the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS)—or, more accurately, the one-third of the sample population who were asked questions about visits to Israel. The full NJPS database has also been analyzed in a series of monographs published by the State University of New York Press. That series includes Fishman's *Jewish Life and American Culture*; Goldstein and Goldstein's *Jews on the Move*; Hartman and Hartman's *Gender Equality and American Jews*; Keysar et al.'s *The Next Generation: Jewish Children and Adolescents*; and Lazerwitz et al.'s *Jewish Choices: American Jewish Denominationalism*. None of these works, however, discusses visits to Israel. In any case, Mittelberg uses other data sources for supplemental and comparative purposes. The most important of these are the 1991 New York Jewish Population Study as a follow-up study of alumni of Otzma, a ten-month work-study program in Israel, which provides the basis for a longitudinal study.

Unfortunately, although graphs and histograms are included in the text presenting the results of statistical analyses, the tabular presentations, often of the results of multiple-classification analysis, are found in an appendix (pp. 137–82). Consequently, relating the discussion to the relevant table, one of seventy, can be rather tedious; the table may be as many as sixty pages removed from the text. Moreover, the labels “visited” and “never visited” of some of the histograms in a central chapter (chap. 8) are reversed; and the Y axis of one graph (fig. 15) is missing. Finally, the definition of terms in the formula relating the couple and individual rate of out-marriage omits needed subscripts (p. 83).

In any event, the statistical analyses presented support the conclusion that a visit to Israel increases the likelihood that one will score higher on the measures of Jewish religious practices (p. 93) and Jewish affiliations (p. 94) than will one who has never visited Israel. These conclusions hold even when educational attainment, household income, and gender are controlled, as well as when Jewish education, Jewish denomination, age, and out-marriage are controlled. When the role of out-marriage is probed further, Mittelberg concludes that a visit to Israel “may well serve to intensify the effect of other agencies of socialization,” such as Jewish education in one’s youth (p. 82). Overall, he concludes that a visit to Israel—particularly one based on an educational program and aimed at people of college age—may well contribute to a more “integrated and coherent meaningful Jewishness” and to the transformation from “ambivalent or dual households with respect to Jewish identity to households where being Jewish serves as the unambiguous core” (p. 116).

In sum, then, this work offers a statistical analysis of survey data on the impact of a visit to Israel, including a longitudinal study of the impact of one program, on ethnic and religious identity among American Jews, bounded by insightful discussions of ethnicity and identity in a modern society. Unfortunately, data analysis and conceptual analysis are not as closely related as might be hoped. Finally, the “connection” between Israel and American Jews examined here is a personal one between the latter and the former. Political and international connections are not considered.

ANDREA NÜSSE, *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998). Pp. 203. \$22.00 paper.

REVIEWED BY MOHAMMED M. HAFEZ, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science

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In a modest but original contribution to the literature on the Islamist movement in the West Bank and Gaza, Andrea Nüsse explores the ideology of the key player in this movement: Hamas.

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Nüsse analyzes Hamas's system of thought, particularly how it frames its struggle against Israel; the arguments it employs to oppose the peace process; and its use of Qur'anic exegeses to underpin its militant, or *jihadi*, stance. The author avoids such issues as the structure of the organization and the social base of its constituency, which have been explored elsewhere. Instead, she relies on primary material to address the goals, strategy, ideological foundations, self-image, and perceived enemies of the movement. In addition to these themes, the author presents Hamas's perspective on contemporary historical events and developments, including the Gulf War of 1990–91, the mass deportation of Islamists to South Lebanon in 1992, and the Hebron massacre of 1994. The aim throughout the book is to shed light on an under-studied aspect of the movement, leaving it up to the reader to seek out other writings that give a more comprehensive analysis.

The principal thesis of the book is that Hamas, like other Islamist movements in the region, does not simply revert to an ancient model of Islamic unity, nor does it hark back to a golden age free of modern or Western influences. On the contrary, the ideology of Hamas is replete with non-Islamic accretions. It combines traditional Islamic teachings with liberal-democratic notions of democracy, Christian anti-Semitism, and even the Judaic idea of the sanctity of the Palestinian territory. Hamas assimilated these ideas, argues Nüsse, by Islamizing them or by showing their "true" origins in Islamic thought. Moreover, a close examination of its ideology reveals that Hamas does not necessarily offer uniquely "Islamic" solutions. Its call for the continuation of the Palestinian *Intifada* (uprising) and its criticism of the authoritarianism of the Palestinian Authority puts it in line with liberal secularists such as Edward Said and Hannan Ashrawi. Just as important, some of the unique features of contemporary Islamism—principally, Sayid Qutb's depiction of the Muslim world as *jahiliyya* (paganism) and the rejection of democracy as an innovation—are implicitly rejected by Hamas. Instead, Hamas's problematique revolves around the worldwide Jewish conspiracy against the Islamic *umma* (nation) and the role of the Israeli state in this conspiracy.

Nüsse points out that Hamas's ideological struggle against the Jewish state is grounded in two sources: Qur'anic passages that denounce the wickedness and treachery of the Jews, and Christian anti-Semitic writings such as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (p. 34). These sources underpin Hamas's dichotomous depiction of the struggle against Israel as *haqq* (truth, God) versus *batil* (ungodly). Moreover, this struggle is part and parcel of a greater struggle between Islam and a worldwide Jewish conspiracy for global hegemony. The state of Israel is a manifestation of this conspiracy, not its principal driving force.

Interestingly, the "wicked" intentions of Israel are also a source of Hamas's admiration for the Jewish state. Israel's strength, according to Hamas, lies in its unambiguous embrace of religion as the foundation of the state. Muslims, Hamas goes on to claim, need no more than to adopt a similar attitude toward their religion to be able to combat Israel (p. 31)—hence, Hamas's goal of establishing a "Muslim Palestine" in which Islamic law reigns.

Jihad is the principal method by which an Islamic state will emerge. Jihad, however, is not limited to Israel and its Western allies. It also includes internal opponents, chiefly the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which does not necessarily represent the Palestinian people and is too eager to compromise at the expense of the Islamist cause. But Hamas makes a point of avoiding direct confrontation with the PLO and, instead, employs a democratic critique of its actions in the territories.

Nüsse's book merits a reading by all those interested in Islamist movements in general and Islamism in the West Bank and Gaza in particular. Nüsse succeeds in providing the reader with an original perspective on Hamas's ideology by making use of primary Arabic material, mainly the movement's 1988 *Mithaq* (or Manifesto), its London-based journal *Filastin al-Muslima*, and its leaflets published in the territories. These sources are not readily available to Western audiences, thus making the author's endeavor all the more worthwhile. Nüsse's exploration of

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these primary documents is balanced; it does not betray her sympathies or antipathies. Although Nüsse is self-admittedly an Orientalist, she distinguishes between Orientalists who seek an “essence of Islam” and those who simply regard texts and ideology as deserving careful scholarly attention (p. 3). She is markedly of the latter sort.

By itself, however, the book cannot serve as an authoritative study of Hamas, mainly because it does not investigate the organizational dimension of the movement or its social base. Moreover, the book could have benefitted from further editorial work. Specifically, there are more than a dozen spelling and grammatical mistakes, and the author in some instances mixes British and American English usage without justification. The overall organization of the book is sound, but several chapters could have been combined into one to avoid uncustomarily short chapters that at times consist of no more than two or three pages (e.g., chap. 4 and 13). Despite these limitations, the value of the book lies in its modest originality, which succeeds in bringing to light new facts and documents.

MARTIN SICKER, *Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 198. \$55.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JAMES A. REILLY, Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto

Martin Sicker’s book is an account of the emergence of Jewish nationalism centered on Palestine during the century prior to the establishment of the British Mandate. It is a tertiary source, written mostly on the basis of published secondary sources. Hence, it offers no new material or interpretations for specialists to consider. The text is clean, unencumbered by a surfeit of notes, and it is easy to grasp. The major audience, in addition to students, would appear to be policy-makers and public-affairs professionals who need a concisely presented and easily digestible historical background study.

The author works within an unexamined nationalist framework (no “imagined communities” or “invented traditions” here). He writes not only as a narrator and analyst of modern Jewish nationalism, but also as an advocate. Thus, he makes simplistic and careless generalizations about Ottoman Palestine, citing Mark Twain as an authority but ignoring most of the burgeoning modern scholarship on the subject. Moreover, he gives short shrift to the lives, interests, and concerns of Palestine’s non-Jewish population. The “Arabs of Cis-Jordan” are shadowy and passive figures who make only a marginal appearance in this narrative on the grounds that, because they had no national consciousness comparable to that of the Jews, they could not and did not articulate their own interests and views. The major actors in Sicker’s story are the Jewish nationalists (dynamic groups and individuals who were advocates of a just cause), the Ottomans (declining, corrupt, and hostile), and the British government (perfidious and opportunistic).

In a pinch, this book might serve a pedagogical purpose as an example of nationalist or partisan history. Otherwise, there is not much to commend it to an academic audience.

J. W. WRIGHT, JR., ED., *The Political Economy of Middle East Peace: The Impact of Competing Trade Agendas* (London: Routledge, 1999). Pp. 288. \$85.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY EDWARD SAYRE, Department of Economics, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio

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It is testimony to the sad state of the study of economics in the Middle East that a work such as *The Political Economy of Middle East Peace: The Impact of Competing Trade Agendas*,

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edited by J. W. Wright, Jr., could be produced. This collection of essays attempts to shed light on the relationship between international economic relations and the peace process. The sloppy scholarship included in this volume would be inexcusable when looking at any other region, but it appears to be acceptable when analyzing Middle Eastern economies. Although this description is not characteristic of all of the essays in the volume, it diminishes the overall quality of this work to such a degree that it detracts from the some of the more enlightening and important papers that are included. For example, Laura Drake's careful examination of "A New Middle East Order" in the first chapter lays out the potential stumbling blocks and hurdles as the process of normalization between Arab states and Israel continues. Unfortunately, the next chapter, by Wright, primarily examines the same topic but almost completely ignores relevant data and scholarship critical to his thesis. While some chapters examine key issues and analyze nuances in the political economy of the Middle East peace process, this uneven and incongruous group of essays is of little value to policy-makers, academics, or students of Middle Eastern political economy.

In the second chapter, "Competing Trade Agendas in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," Wright puts forth a tantalizing thesis that ulterior economic interests have caused peace brokers to pay only lip service to advancing the peace process. Unfortunately, Wright attempts to analyze the political economy of this issue without developing an internally consistent theory or using appropriate data. For example, Wright argues that Israeli labor's reaction to Netanyahu was based on "closures not being in their best interest" (p. 45), completely ignoring the data showing that the Israeli economy had not been dependent on Palestinian labor since the importation of guest workers began in 1994. Several topics presented in the chapter (e.g., inter-regional labor movements) have been analyzed in a large body of extant literature, but the author does not cite or appear to have any knowledge of these works. Several sources that are cited predate the Declaration of Principles, despite the availability of more recent data and scholarship. An example of the latter is found when Wright discusses "the 50 percent decline in Jordan's gross national product (GNP) since the Gulf War" (p. 50) in the context of Palestinian regional trade. These data are based on an article written in 1991, even though he is making an argument about what is occurring in 1999.

Chapter 5, Fatemeh Ziai's essay on economic injustice (primarily in the form of closures) as a human-rights violation in Palestinian territories, contains weaknesses similar to those cited earlier. Despite the existence of comprehensive data sets collected by the Israeli and the Palestinian Central Bureaus of Statistics, the author supports her analysis of the unemployment situation in the West Bank and Gaza by using data that are no more than "guesstimates." International Labor Organization definitions of unemployment are a rigorous guideline to ensure that figures are compatible across countries, which both the Israeli and Palestinian official sources use. Although there is sufficient room for criticism of a specific survey methodology, disregarding higher-quality official data for lower-quality data that better supports one's thesis does nothing but detract from serious scholarship on Palestinian labor markets.

One exceptional essay in the collection is Robert E. Looney's "Internal and External Constraints on Saudi Arabian Economic Growth." Looney uses Saudi fiscal accounts and gross domestic product data to determine whether the characteristics that helped determine economic growth in Saudi Arabia changed (i.e., was there a structural break?) or whether, instead, the same development scheme simply encountered diminishing returns. In order to answer this question, the author employs a variety of time-series econometric techniques. The evidence presented shows that the structure of the regime's development policies did not change so much as the effectiveness of previous policies were diminished by throwing additional money into bad policies and projects. The author could have presented the results more tersely and clearly and given a more thorough explanation of his empirical techniques (with which the audience is probably largely unfamiliar), but the article's main weakness is that it has almost no relation

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to the rest of the volume: it is easily the farthest removed from the collection's overall character. The only issue that ties it to the rest of the papers is that one of the factors Looney examines is the role of defense expenditures in the fiscal-policy regime of the Saudi government.

Looney's chapter and several others raise the overall level of quality of the collection by presenting reliable, current data in order to understand the political economy of war and peace in the region. For example, the essay by Lewin-Epstein, Semoyanov, and Wright, "The Israeli Dilemma over Economic Discrimination and Labor Market Competition," lucidly summarizes previously published, extensively thorough, and thoughtful scholarship by Lewin-Epstein and Semoyanov, which examines economic discrimination against Palestinians in the Israeli labor market. Likewise, in Chapter 3, Nitzan and Bichler present an intriguing examination of Israeli political economy and changes in the relationship between the military-industrial sector and the state effected by the peace process. The authors view the acceptance of the peace process by the Israeli elite as a consequence of the changes in the international political economy associated with the rise in globalization.

The volume ends with a bold epilogue in which George Wilson links the probable effects of peace in the region to the collapse of communism and the rise of the United States as the sole superpower. The essay is bold in that Wilson states unequivocally that "[Free trade in the region] is the only way to improve the economies of the poorest countries and to achieve a permanent ceasefire" (p. 235). This essay ultimately fails, like so much of this volume, because it ignores the scholarship that has already looked at this issue and found strong evidence for the opposite conclusion.

In the Introduction, Wright explains that the reason for this work was the lacuna in scholarship covering Middle East diplomacy and regional economic integration—a lacuna that has resulted in the fact that "too often negotiators and others in the region have allowed rhetoric rather than reality to control their actions and perceptions" (p. 1). Thus, the goal of this work was to provide serious research in order to obviate the need to depend on "rhetoric." Unfortunately, the volume fails on this front. By ignoring existing data and literature and instead using data that fit a particular version of "reality," several of the essays—and thus, the volume in general—do little but perpetuate the lack of serious scholarship on these issues.

HASSAN N. DIAB, *Beirut: Reviving Lebanon's Past* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1999). Pp. 144. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY MALEK ABISAAB, World Civilizations Program, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio

The fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon and its destructive social effects have called for soul-searching by many Lebanese. Hassan Diab explores the regional and international economic developments that caused political instability and led to episodes of civil strife and social upheaval in Lebanon from the late Ottoman period until recent times. Further, Diab promises to assess the revival of Beirut's past through the governmental project of Rafiq Hariri known as Horizon 2000, and the ramifications of reconstructing downtown Beirut in the aftermath of the civil war. Diab raises a number of legitimate concerns about the validity and necessity of these projects and the extent to which they can prevent the eruption of a civil war in the future.

Diab describes the development of the Lebanese economy and society and its incorporation into the world market during the mid-19th century. Beirut, he notes, became a Mediterranean entrepôt between the industrialized West and the impoverished Middle East, ushering in, in turn, a "modernization process" that was dependent on the economic pulse and rhythms of Europe. A hybrid capitalist system arose under the leadership of a comprador bourgeoisie who

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modeled the entire society upon laissez faire principles and suppressed any possibility of self-initiated growth in agriculture and industry. By 1943, the marginalization of the Lebanese productive sectors caused deterioration in the standard of living and kept the infrastructure of the peripheral regions intact and suffering from bleak job-market opportunities. After 1943, Beirut and Mount Lebanon received focused attention from successive governments that treated it as Lebanon's economic center and, as such, as the political and cultural "core" of the country. The remaining parts of Lebanon—namely, the east, and north, and the south—were relegated to peripheral status, both geographically and conceptually.

This policy, in Diab's view, created the internal structural basis for inequity and deep-seated schisms and tensions in the Lebanese polity and led to the marginalization of vast productive sectors of society. These developments undermined Lebanese unity across sectarian and geographical lines, leading to a chain of socio-political disturbances that culminated in the civil war of 1975–90. By highlighting the shortcomings of the policies of the First Lebanese Republic (1943–91), Diab warns today's leaders of the Second Lebanese Republic of another major crisis if these problems are not recognized.

Dependency theory forms the analytical framework of Diab's work, while the core-periphery dichotomy permeates central parts of it in a rather mechanical and ahistorical manner. No attempt is made to gauge whether the capitalist experiment in Lebanon and its particular internal characteristics had deviated from, for example, the model of Mexico or Brazil. The author refers to the works of Hamzah Alavi, André Gunder Frank, Mark Gottdiener, and Samir Amin, among others, to reconfirm their principal thesis—stretched out in four chapters—that the process of aggrandizing Beirut and Lebanon in the world market was simply futile. Lebanese planners and citizens alike across class, region, gender, and sect are portrayed as passive agents, because decision-making powers lie outside Lebanon, somewhere in the metropolis of the world market. Diab's conclusions raise serious questions as to the utility of theorizing, let alone studying, Lebanese history and peoples when their views and actions seem in his work to be fatalistically and exclusively determined by outside forces.

Beirut: Reviving Lebanon's Past echoes a largely uniform discourse in the literature on Mount Lebanon that views the modernization of the silk industry under European domination as the earliest phase of capitalism in Lebanon. Recent studies have shown that Ottoman peasant families, Lebanese and otherwise, partook in the traditional manual fabrication of silk, cotton, and wool a long time before the integration of their economy into the world market. These principal crafts produced market-oriented commodities that were not exclusively directed to local family use. These features clearly pointed to the genesis of capitalist relations in Lebanese society prior to the age of European domination. Nevertheless, the mechanization of the silk industry and its integration into the European market strangled its potential for progress. What needs to be emphasized with respect to this historical juncture is the reaction of the peasant families who started to replace silk with tobacco to meet the new imperatives of the market. This was a vivid sign of the active role of Lebanese peasants in counteracting the fluctuations of the market economy.

The proclivity to depict the people of the "Third World" as phlegmatic is most alarming, especially when Diab decides that "Lebanon's independence can be attributed less to any nationalist struggle than to external factors, such as the Franco-British competition over colonial domination" (p. 35). He omits the role of several Levantine social sectors and popular groups in the resistance to French occupation, placing great weight on the intentions and actions of the colonialists during their struggles over spheres of influence. Thus, the significance of the 1925 Syrian Revolt, the 1936 uprising of the Lebanese tobacco farmers, and the wave of labor strikes initiated by Syrian-Lebanese working women and men was sacrificed in favor of a static depiction of these national struggles as a "child play."

There are no new revelations in this work, which further suffers from an uncritical and heavy

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reliance on secondary literature. The final chapter is the only part of this work with useful historical material and some insights into post-civil war Lebanon. But again, Diab does not analyze in full the reasons for the anticipated failure of the governmental plans to revive Beirut's past. The book as a whole can benefit from additional research on Bahrain, Athens, or Amman, all of which, Diab suggests, have assumed the financial and commercial role of Beirut in that region.

JOHN FISHER, *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916–1919* (London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1999). Pp. 358.

REVIEWED BY WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, Department of History, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia

It should be noted from the outset that for this reviewer, *Curzon and British Imperialism* proved to be a very difficult read. It falls within the category of pure diplomatic history—the kind that unfolds dispatch by dispatch, direct quotation by direct quotation; that contains an overwhelming number of endnotes (1,170 for 244 pages of text); and that is packed with sentences such as: “Neither the objection raised by Chamberlain, that this would contravene the Hague Convention, nor the possibility of upsetting the Russians, to which Robert Graham alluded, deterred Curzon who, noting the concurrence of Hardinge and McMahon, suggested that the views of the Government of India be sought on a change in Cox’s status” (p. 58). The inclusion of so much undigested material tends to obscure any larger theme that John Fisher may be pursuing. And although he claims to admire Elie Kedourie, that scholar, whatever one may think of his views, was a master at synthesis and pointed argumentation. These qualities are mostly lacking in Fisher’s work.

The main purpose of this book appears to be to present the diverse and often conflicting views of a small group of policy-makers on the question of how best to achieve and preserve British interests in selected regions of the Middle East from 1916 to 1919. Of particular importance in Fisher’s discussion are Mesopotamia, Arabia, and the Caucasus. The significance of other areas—Palestine and Syria—for example, flow from the centrality of Mesopotamia to British imperial interests. Fisher also seeks to examine the reasons behind the British Middle East establishment’s rapid disillusionment with the Sykes–Picot agreement and points out some of their attempts to modify it to Britain’s advantage—or, more aptly, to France’s disadvantage. Fisher is further interested in (as was Kedourie) the policy-makers’ efforts to create the façade of Arab self-government while maintaining the pre-war belief that military conquest offered sufficient justification for continued occupation of a territory. Throughout the book, Fisher correctly emphasizes the crippling effects of the competition between the Foreign Office and the India Office to determine policy in Mesopotamia. The author’s purpose for giving Curzon such a central place in the title of the book is not clear. Throughout the work, other figures—Leo Amery, Arthur Hirtzel, Arthur Balfour, Lloyd George, Mark Sykes, and Arnold Wilson, among others—often figure more prominently than does Curzon. Although Fisher’s conclusion focuses on Curzon, it sheds no new analytical light on Curzon’s role in foreign policy.

One of the major difficulties with Fisher’s approach is that he offers neither introductions nor conclusions to his chapters. His failure to problematize his material or to offer any connecting arguments for his relentless stream of citations adds to the difficulties of comprehending the purpose of the book. This problem is immediately evident in chapter 1, which opens in the middle of a debate on the advisability of British occupation of Alexandretta. However, the focus soon shifts to Mesopotamia, and the chapter concludes with a less-than-satisfactory discussion of the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

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Following the British capture of Baghdad in 1917, the War Department created the Mesopotamian Administration Committee to explore the ways and means by which Britain could retain its dominant influence in Basra and Baghdad while appearing to honor its agreements with France and Sharif Husayn. As chairman of this committee, Lord Curzon was in a position to put forth his policy of forward imperialism. However, as a figure who regarded the concept of self-determination as “ridiculous,” Curzon lacked the spirit of compromise that the changing international circumstances required, and Fisher shows, from chapter 2 onward, the successful attempts of the Foreign Office to marginalize Curzon and his committee.

Chapter 3 focuses on Arabia and consists largely of an exchange of opinions, conjectures, and disagreements among British policy-makers concerning Franco-Italian ambitions in the peninsula and how best to counter them. If the chapter reveals anything of substance, it is the degree to which Britain’s mistrust and misunderstanding of its allies’ intentions shaped its Middle East policy during the war. Chapter 4 continues the discussion of Mesopotamia and the continuing problem of how to hold on to it—and to acquire Mosul—without appearing to violate previous agreements. However, at this point in the narrative (1918) the British had to take into consideration an important new factor in the international arena. Fisher provides several useful citations pointing out how profoundly concerned officials in the Foreign and India offices were over Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of self-determination and the role those ideas might play at any future peace conference. Some of the solutions proposed to counter the threat of Wilsonian principles border on the comical. Lord Balfour was convinced that Wilson most surely did not intend to apply his ideology to non-European countries; others thought that offering the Palestine Mandate to the United States might persuade Wilson to moderate his stance; and almost all agreed that the American public needed to be educated about the advantages that British rule had brought to the territories under its control.

Chapter 5 and portions of chapter 6 are devoted to exchanges of opinions about Britain’s future role in the Caucasus and Transcaspia. Curzon is front and center in this debate. An early advocate of establishing a British presence in the region as a perimeter for the defense of India, he continued to push this policy when he became acting foreign secretary in 1919. But as Fisher demonstrates through the citation of some heated exchanges, Curzon was outmaneuvered on this issue by Lloyd George, and in the process his stewardship of the Foreign Office was diminished from the very beginning.

Fisher has succeeded in portraying the chaos, bickering, and lack of coordination that characterized aspects of British wartime decision-making on Middle Eastern affairs. He is less successful in demonstrating how—or even whether—the conflicting perspectives of individual officials were hammered together to produce a set of policy guidelines. Despite the book’s shortcomings, it is the product of a prodigious research effort, and therein lies its primary usefulness. Fisher has read widely in collections of private papers and has mined a rich variety of sources in the Public Records Office. His extensive and often discursive endnotes will have to be taken into consideration by any future scholar intending to examine the British perspective on the crucial years covered in this book.

JAMES L. GELVIN, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998). Pp. 342. \$50.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY LISA WEDEEN, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

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James L. Gelvin’s *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* isolates a two-year period, between the end of Ottoman rule and the beginning of the

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French Mandate, to examine a critical moment in the development of nationalism in Syria. He draws on previously unanalyzed primary source material, including leaflets, newspaper reports and editorials, memoirs, speeches, rumors, and even graffiti, to reveal the processes through which modern nationalisms in the Arab East were created. In doing so, he undermines two basic assumptions in the literature on Arab nationalism (p. 5). First, in contrast to the vision of Arab identity as a long-repressed primordial national consciousness—what political scientist Ronald Grigor Suny terms the “Sleeping Beauty” view—Gelvin shows instead how nationalism was subject to varying interpretations and conflicting visions. For Gelvin, Arab nationalism has “achieved a retrospective homogeneity and coherence” in the scholarly literature, which it did not have historically (p. 7). Second, Gelvin challenges the prevailing view that the phenomenon of Arab nationalism can be adequately captured by way of elite-centric intellectual histories.

Instead of focusing on indigenous elites as the “sole originators, carriers, and disseminators of nationalism,” Gelvin explores the neglected world of popular politics (p. 5). He shifts attention away from the urban-based, landowning bureaucratic notables and the professional journalists and intellectuals who have been the dominant objects of academic work on Arab nationalism. For Gelvin, national elites were “ultimately circumscribed by the ability of their ideas to articulate with the aspirations of other elements of the population” (p. 9). By studying transformations in the nature of political organizing before, during, and after World War I, Gelvin demonstrates how large numbers of ordinary people became available for mobilization, thereby enabling a rival “discursive community” to challenge the Faysal government’s vision of national membership. In addition to written sources, the author investigates the use of public ceremonies and street demonstrations, which, he argues, served to generate popular support while also instructing cadres on proper understandings of the nation.

Gelvin’s argument fits well within a growing scholarship on nationalism that questions the seamless narratives of official histories and disputes the immutable, static, “always already there” version of the genesis of any national identity. His book also adopts a view frequently referred to as “social constructionism” or “constructivism.” Social constructionists posit identities as multiple, contextual, and flexible. Nations are not natural or ancient forms of organizing communities but characteristically modern ways of imagining a shared sense of belonging. Arab nationalism, in this view, is not expressive of a consensually shared Arab identity—or *ethnie*, to borrow Anthony D. Smith’s term—but was created through struggles ensuing under the social, economic, and political conditions of Ottoman and Faysali rule. Many scholars of the Middle East do situate the origins of Arab nationalism historically, but they tend to neglect the fundamental differences that divided advocates of the Arab cause. Moreover, evidence from the immediate post-Ottoman period does not merit privileging an “Arab” identity over others, according to Gelvin: “For the inhabitants of Syria, an ‘Arab’ identity not only represented one possible identity among several, but . . . signaled an affinity with a select group of attitudes toward intercommunal relations, the nature of the bonds uniting members of the community, the relationship between the government and the ‘nation,’ the role of the sharifian family in Syria’s future, relations with the Hijaz, Turkey, and Iraq, and a variety of other issues” (p. 143). Gelvin shows that this Arab nationalism did not represent the desires of even the majority of active participants in nationalist politics, “much less a majority of Syrians, during the Faysali period” (p. 143).

Social constructionists are unlikely to be startled by Gelvin’s findings: assertions of identities as multiple, contextual, and fluid have come to sound like incantations in the academy, familiar recitations that are as unsurprising as they are correct. Gelvin’s important contribution to this literature is his insight that, despite the historical specificity and constructed character of the nation form, periods of “national crisis and/or mobilization” may “effect a temporary reification of the boundaries separating self-ascribed national subjects from an external ‘other’ and induce those subjects to privilege the bonds of nation over other attachments” (pp. 12, 146). Crises

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may prompt national identifications to override other experiences of community while also making such identifications seem natural and fixed when they are not.

Gelvin's study also advances our understanding of the emergence of mass politics in Syria. Transformations in markets and administrative reforms under 19th-century Ottoman rule resulted in corresponding changes in social and political relations for many inhabitants of the empire. Gelvin identifies three key dimensions of the shift for Syrians. First, formal politics expanded as the state assumed new functions and wrested control of tasks from institutions that were previously independent of the state. Mobilized by both the state and its opponents, and experiencing greater access to modern transportation and communications technology, an increasing number of Syrians began to contest political issues in public (p. 51). Second, economic integration of the empire into the periphery of the capitalist world system and the effects of Ottoman administrative reforms standardized "cultural norms and practices." People became "subjected to the leveling forces of market and state," but they also experienced changes differentially and unevenly. New "subcultures" were institutionalized in ways expressive of variant social locations and political ideals (pp. 51–52). Third, changes in economic, administrative, and urban conditions made possible a gradual shift in relationships of power—away from vertical patronage networks toward horizontal, associational relationships, which Gelvin sees as conducive to some forms of nationalism (pp. 52, 296).

Divided Loyalties is a social history that pays particular attention to the politics of rhetoric and symbols. It takes seriously evidence that is often dismissed as epiphenomenal by "materialist" scholars. On the basis of a rich selection of texts, Gelvin analyzes the divergent meanings that slogans, "key symbols," and public ceremonies had for the two main nationalist communities in Syria—the cultural elite or *mutanawwirun*, who backed Faysal, and the popular committees, which appealed to those who perceived themselves as victims of economic, social, and political "peripheralization" (p. 220).

The virtue of Gelvin's semiotic approach emerges clearly in his demonstration of how the cultural elite failed to express an inclusive vision of Syria that was capable of generating mass appeal. Despite diverse class backgrounds, the popular committees were able to tap into the shared sense of *ressentiment*, conjuring referents that resonated broadly and inspiring popular demonstrations. At its best, Gelvin's investigation treats the language, symbols, and public spectacles both as systems of signification that publicly represent each group's understanding of national membership and as functional strategies to appeal to members and define the parameters within which meaningful political participation can take place. In other words, the book's sections on symbolism are most compelling when they demonstrate how rhetoric and symbols simultaneously exemplify competing ideas of the nation and operate as a means of building a national community.

Gelvin's discussion of these different vocabularies and polyvalent referents can be belabored and repetitive, but his is an important intervention, drawing our attention to contrasts and contestation among proponents of the Arab cause. The book shows that symbols and the discursive fields within which they work do more than represent an idealized world. Symbols operate as forms of power in their own right, inspiring adherents and providing appropriate guidelines for political activity (p. 197).

The primary weakness of the book becomes evident when the author retreats from the constructionist insights he otherwise champions and argues in deterministic language. Assertions of inevitability and appeals to the "natural" are neither empirical claims nor even consistent with the theoretical commitments of the book, in which history is seen as non-teleological and contingent. Most of the time, Gelvin argues that the various Arab nationalisms were brought into existence and shaped by historical events and social forces, which could well have been different. But the language of the book sometimes participates in the very sorts of determinism the author seeks to criticize. Because, as Ian Hacking notes, scholars argue that something is

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socially constructed precisely when they find, in the present state of affairs, that that very something *appears* to be inevitable, Gelvin's argument occasionally seems caught between disavowing an apparent inevitability and asserting it.

This perplexity does not diminish the book's considerable strengths, however. *Divided Loyalties* is a well-researched, theoretically informed study. Gelvin's work embraces the complexities of identity formation and elite-mass relations. He manages to refresh the debate on Arab nationalism and give readers a welcome sense of the dialectical relationship between elite and popular understandings of national belonging. *Divided Loyalties* is a fine addition to conversations about Arab nationalism in particular, and to the scholarship on nationalism in general.

CHARLES ISSAWI, *Cross-Cultural Encounters and Conflicts*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Pp. 150. \$27.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY USSAMA MAKDISI, Department of History, Rice University, Houston, Tex.

This slim volume reproduces essays written over the past two decades by Charles Issawi, the now-retired Bayard Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. Collected and published in a series edited by Bernard Lewis, this volume represents a tribute to one of the best-known intellectuals to have shaped the field of Middle Eastern economic history. Issawi is on one level an economist; on another, he is a historian; and on a third, he is a dilettante in the true sense of the word. The essays republished in this volume attest to this: they cover a wide range of subjects, from Shelley to Ibn Khaldun, from discussions of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire to Ancient Greece and the Classics; from the costs of the French Revolution to the struggle between the French and English for linguistic hegemony in the world. They highlight Issawi's wide intellectual range and curiosity. Some are written in an informal style; others are whimsical. Some will provoke the ire of readers; others, their titillation. Few are meant to be read as pioneering scholarship. These essays represent one scholar looking back at his own career and the questions that have guided him throughout.

Over the past half-century, Issawi has witnessed tumultuous changes both in the Middle East and in the academic coverage of the Middle East. His own career has spanned the creation of Israel and the consequent Palestinian diaspora; the end of monarchy in Egypt and the rise of Nasser; the age of Arabism and today's more Islamist turn; the fall of Lebanon and, with it, a final nail in the coffin of a cosmopolitanism in the Levant that, by his own admission, had long fascinated Issawi (p. 3). Throughout this period, Issawi has been grappling with many questions, but one has come to predominate his work in the past two decades: how can the "decline" of the Middle East be explained? It is this single question that, in a sense, gives this little volume its coherence. No matter what subject Issawi broaches, this question is always lurking underneath.

The book opens with an essay, originally delivered to Princeton alumni in 1986, entitled "The Clash of Cultures in the Near East" in which Issawi opines on the current state of what he sees as a "clash of cultures" (p. 7) that has dominated East-West relations. In it Issawi anticipates what is now a very well-known argument about a clash of civilizations. This essay sets the tone of the volume with assertions of a "Muslim revulsion against the West" (p. 16). Issawi, however, echoes not Samuel Huntington or even Bernard Lewis, who was Issawi's colleague at Princeton and undoubtedly influences many of the pages and questions asked and answered this collection. Rather, Issawi takes his cue from men such as Lord Cromer, whose book *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* frames his second essay, "Empire Builders, Culture Makers, and Culture Imprinters," which seeks to answer the impossible questions of why "the Romans and not the Greeks," why the "Arabs and not the Persians," and why the "Russians

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and not the Germans” founded cultural civilizations (p. 23). Issawi answers this question somewhat anticlimactically by insisting that “a people’s success in culture imprinting bears no direct relationship to its brilliance in ‘high culture’” (p. 37). Like Cromer, Issawi seeks fairly succinct answers to vast questions. While Cromer put his answer in terms of “master races” and “subject races,” Issawi uses less imperialist but no less categorical terms of “civilizations.” Both, however, agree in their fundamental assessment of the world they live in, a world shaped by the 19th-century colonialism in which Western powers took control of more than 85 percent of the world’s surface; in which colonialism confidently issued its searing categorical judgments on the intrinsic difference and teleological divide between West and East; and indeed, in which the West took technological, economic, military, cultural, musical—in short, total—superiority over the East. That is, modernity became the preserve of the West, and Muslims are simply reacting against it. The inhabitants of the Middle East are haunted by their past, unable, Issawi sincerely believes, to comprehend the fact that they have declined precipitously compared with Western culture and civilization. And Issawi has the figures to prove it: the Ottomans were economic failures, and their economic legacy to the Middle East, he asserts in his essay “The Ottoman Economic Legacy,” is manifested in the “backward state of natural sciences today (p. 81)” in the Arab world. Even Ibn Khaldun, whom Issawi genuinely admires, comes up short because of his limited knowledge of Greek culture. The Arabs and Orientals, it seems, just can’t win—although Issawi yet holds out hope for the Chinese.

Many scholars may not think less of Issawi for his perspective of an “age-long conflict” (p. 149) between West and East. In fact, many probably would agree, in an unguarded moment, more or less with the general sentiment of Western superiority that permeates Issawi’s volume. In this regard, Issawi must be credited with repeatedly asking questions that many academics today would prefer not to answer. He is able to speculate about the colonial era without seeming to suffer from a jaundiced nationalist eye. Others, however, may question Issawi’s use of UNESCO statistics from 1989 on the low number of potential scientists and engineers in Turkey and the Arab world to judge Ottoman economic performance (p. 81). In this regard, Issawi’s relentless judgment of West and East precludes his ability to pose original questions for future research, for the conclusion of Western superiority is already determined—all that is left for the historian is to show how and why. And still others may wonder at Issawi’s droll characterization of the period of post–World War I European imperialism in the Middle East, which led directly to the tremendously destructive and ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict (which Issawi ignores completely in these essays) as an era in which “[n]either side was on its best behavior and neither was enchanted with what it saw of the other” (p. 148).

Issawi is a scholar shaped by his time. Faulting him for asking questions in terms of categorical civilizational clashes underestimates the importance these questions played—and, to a certain extent, still play—in the lives of most scholars and citizens who have an intimate knowledge of the Middle East. It also judges him by the standards of a field that has been drastically changed, if not revolutionized, since the publication of Edward Said’s *Orientalism*. Issawi has resisted the deluge, and this volume is a testament to that pre-*Orientalism* time and to the work of one of its most prominent intellectuals. This, perhaps, is the only way to read this book.

NIKKI R. KEDDIE, *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796–1925* (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 1999). Pp. 142. \$16.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY G. R. GARTHWAITE, Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.

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The Qajars always get a bad rap; at best, they and their long 19th-century rule (1796 [actually even earlier]–1925) are regarded as something of an embarrassment. Qajar incompetence and

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bad government, with little concern for reform and with acquiescence to imperialism, characterized that period. In comparison with other contemporary Middle Eastern governments, there is neither a Mahmud II nor a Muhammad 'Ali. While one Qajar shah, facing revolution, issued an order for a constitutional assembly and signed its Fundamental Law in 1906, his successor would lead a coup against it, even though he signed the Supplementary Fundamental Law and swore to uphold the constitution. Government virtually disappeared during and after World War I, and the last Qajar shah was especially ineffective. Certainly, the Qajars have earned their reputation.

Similarly, Reza Khan—who led an anti-Qajar coup in 1921 and was elected shah in 1925, to be crowned the following year, thus establishing the Pahlavi dynasty—receives bad press for his autocracy, even though he could well be the most pivotal figure in 20th-century Iranian history.

The Qajars, moreover, are viewed as a bridge between traditional and modern Iran. Although they are consigned to the traditional in that dichotomy, they are also the victims of being viewed from a perspective of what is modern and progressive, or through the lens of more recent history. Seen within their own historical context—late Safavid and 18th-century Iran—the Qajars may come off somewhat better. As much as the Safavids, the Qajars were responsible for reconstituting the monarchy and establishing Iran's international borders, although they irretrievably lost the Caucasian provinces and Herat. Moreover, the basis for modern Iranian nationalism was laid then, partly in reaction to Qajar misrule.

Reza Khan, too, reunited Iran against the threat of fragmentation by regional elites and groups and Soviet and British imperial machinations. The basis for the Pahlavi nation-state was established through centralization of power and modern institutions. Nationalism, in addition, would now be grounded on an Iranian rather than an Islamic past. The strains between the Qajars and the ulema, which included changes in religious ideology and institutional roles and the emergence of secularism, continued in the early Pahlavi years. Parallel social and economic changes resulted in the emergence of new social classes and institutions. In short, changes that began under the Qajars would transform Iran and its political culture under the Pahlavis. Of course, the Shah would be faulted for aborting constitutionalism in favor of concentrating power in his own hands as autocrat. It is too easy to forget that Tehran was chosen by the Qajars, then continued by the Pahlavis, as the capital.

Western and Persian sources, beginning with the 19th century, are increasingly plentiful, but the Western sources are especially beguiling and view both the Qajars and Reza Khan with disdain. When Reza Khan became shah, the British recognized the value of his centralization and totalitarian government for their own imperial interests. The problem for the historian is how to get at the historical reality through a persistent Orientalist filter embedded in the Western texts—even in some Persian texts—and subsequent analyses. Given the negative perceptions and impact of the Qajars and Reza Kahn, all primary and secondary sources need to be used critically. For a variety of related reasons, the Qajar period was long ignored, save for certain notable exceptions—including Keddie—and for certain fields. Recently, there has been a revival of interest in the Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, and a number of new studies examine this important history.

A generation ago in the United States, Keddie pioneered critical historical analysis of 19th- and early-20th-century Iran; in *Qajar Iran*, she returns to that time frame. Her own career started with concerns for agriculture and land tenure and turned to revolution and revolutionary movements. The social and intellectual history of Iran and the Middle East—including religion and society, with its 19th-century background and 20th-century manifestations—have continued to be central to her many important publications. The impact of these publications and Keddie's standards for critical thinking are also seen through her continuing support for, and key mentoring of, all of us in Iranian studies.

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In *Qajar Iran*, Keddie essentially follows a chronological and political framework. Her first chapter, however, provides a succinct historical and cultural context and is aptly titled, “Main Trends in Iranian History and Culture.” In an all-too-brief Conclusion, Keddie brings some of these trends together to examine the relationship of the Qajar era to subsequent developments in the whole of the 20th century. She observes: “Though the Qajar period did not see significant modernization, it did see the development of socioeconomic and political forces that were to make more rapid change possible.” And this is the point of *Qajar Iran*: the forces for change rubbing against the status quo moved Iranian society and history in a new variety of directions that continue to the present.

What is the purpose of this brief volume—Keddie’s account covers fewer than one hundred pages—and, in the end, what contribution does it make? On the one hand, there is little new here. Keddie covers essentially the same ground in her still magisterial synthesis, *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran* (Yale University Press, 1981). *Qajar Iran*’s paperback format, price, and narrative synthesis target it for the general reading public. Middle East specialists, however, will find it useful and its synthesis stimulating. Although the framework is chronological, political, and Tehran-centered, *Qajar Iran* is less concerned with shahs than with Iran’s international interaction, social and economic change, culture—including religion, literature, and the arts—women, and the many ethnic groups that characterize Iranian society. Within this larger context and the social and cultural friction leading to revolution, Keddie goes beyond the usual Orientalist and negative portrayal of the Qajar era to a positive understanding of the forces that shaped change. In a brief survey such as *Qajar Iran*, what is included and excluded becomes critical, and the balance achieved reflects Keddie’s broad knowledge and reading.

Qajar Iran also includes an all-too-brief but fascinating appendix: Keddie’s translation from French of Farrokh Ghaffary’s “Theatrical Buildings and Performances in Tehran.” Popular culture, including *ta’ziyah/shabih khānī* (the dramatic public reenactment of the passion of the Imams), *rū-hauzī* (traditional performances of comedy in more private settings), Western theater, and cinema are described in this appendix. Especially noteworthy are the descriptions of, and illustrations for, the *Takiyah Daulat*, that very large Tehran amphitheater—it accommodated some 20,000 spectators—whose construction began in 1867. Following the appendix are a number of photographs from the 19th and early 20th centuries, with brief captions. Photography was an important new cultural form in the Qajar era; Nasir al-Din Shah himself was taken with it. Keddie, too, has had a long interest in photography, so it is somewhat surprising that she does not analyze photography, as it relates so well to her concern for changing society and culture under the Qajars. The inclusion of these photographs without context leaves them open to Orientalist interpretation.

Qajar Iran concludes with a select bibliography of English-language books. Each of us could come up with additions to it, but especially notable for its absence on my list would be Richard Tapper’s *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan* (Cambridge University Press, 1997). It is a regional study critical for understanding Qajar Iran. I would also include Farzaneh Milani’s *Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers* (Syracuse University Press, 1992), for it contains the most detailed analysis of the Babi leader and poet Qurrat al-‘Ain, whose mid-19th-century role is included by Keddie. Also missing is *Ta’ziyeh: Ritual and Drama in Iran*, ed. Peter Chelkowski (New York University Press, 1979). And strikingly absent is one of Keddie’s own edited volumes, *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change*, ed. Michael Bonine and Nikki Keddie (State University of New York Press, 1981). Three additional titles, too recently published for inclusion, could be added, as well: Cyrus Ghani’s *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power* (I.B. Tauris, 1998); *Sevruguin and the Persian Image: Photographs of Iran, 1870–1930*, ed. Frederick N. Bohrer (Smithsonian/University of Washington Press, 1999), and Baqer Moin’s

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Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (I.B. Tauris, 1999). The early chapters in Moin's *Khomeini* provide us with insight into the ulema culture of late Qajar and early Pahlavi Iran.

Qajar Iran provides general readers and students with a succinct, comprehensive, authoritative, and convenient presentation of major themes and developments in Iran's 19th and 20th century. Specialists, too, will find it of value. Keddie is a leading scholar and intellectual, one who is especially broad in her reading and background and incisive and provocative in her analyses. Even in her return to a subject that she has covered so well in other publications, *Qajar Iran* provides us with new insights.

MICHAEL J. REIMER, *Colonial Bridgehead: Government and Society in Alexandria 1807–1882* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997). Pp. 266.

REVIEWED BY AMIRA EL-AZHARY SONBOL, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Michael Reimer's history of Alexandria, based on his doctoral thesis, is a welcome addition to the literature on the history of Egypt. It is also among the few works that have focused on the history of important cities and towns outside the capital, Cairo, which has been one of the most extensively studied of cities of the Middle East. One hopes that we will see more books covering other towns of the Middle East so we can get a better picture of historical transformations outside designated centers.

The book actually begins before 1807 with the history of Alexandria since its founding and a geographical analysis defining the founding and history of the city. The Ottoman period is then discussed to lay the basis from which 19th-century changes would take off. The larger body of the book details the expansion of the city from a small, sparsely populated port at the beginning of the 19th century to its growth into Egypt's major port by the end of the last quarter of the century. The narrative ends with the 'Urabi revolt—how it began and its significance to Alexandrian society. In between we are taken through a series of junctures roughly coinciding with who was ruling Egypt and presented with a survey of the growth of Alexandria as a town, urban expansion, and the diversity of population as the town grew in importance. Here the story begins with Muhammad 'Ali Pasha and continues under the rule of 'Abbas and Sa'id. Reimer illustrates that Alexandria was quite central to Egypt's rulers, who used it extensively as a residence and administrative center. Perhaps the strongest aspect of the book is its discussion of how a town such as Alexandria, which was central to government policy and, at the same time, was very much the subject of foreign commercial and residential interest, grew administratively. Although the government had its own centralization projects, the foreign community wanted to make sure that it had direct input into the decisions being made in regard to planning and structuring the city. Two organizations show how this worked: the Health Council, which supervised health conditions in the port, and the Ornato commission, which supervised and approved building plans in the "modern" parts of the city. These examples are well used by Reimer to illustrate the dynamics of conflicting relations and interests that characterized Alexandria's politics.

As an urban study, the book contributes other important points for historians. First, the growth in services such as running water and railways is well documented throughout the book. Second, Reimer discusses the creation of dual towns, which is typical of similar situations where towns grew under colonial tutelage, although in Alexandria's case the roots of duality began earlier than the British invasion of 1882. If anything, as the book illustrates, it is because of the existence of the inequalities resulting from this dual structure that Egypt was invaded by

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British troops. Third, Reimer argues that such colonial situations invariably result in violence and clashes between competing groups. In the case of Alexandria, the clashes were mostly between foreigners and Egyptians.

Perhaps because of the focus on the history of administration, the book over-emphasizes the role of the central government in the development of Alexandria. The Khedives—as Reimer labels them, although the first to hold the title of khedive in Egypt was Isma‘il Pasha—pushed change. Yet the author does allude to the importance of civil groups in efforts to control changes in their towns. The problem here, however, is that the civil groups studied were invariably foreign groups. Alexandria seemed first to be dominated by Maghribians, then by Europeans. Egyptians were a minor element in the picture and were placed within the category of natives holding such jobs as donkey-drivers, menial laborers, or craftsmen. The picture is disturbing and does little to present a social history of Alexandria, the second purpose of the book. Even though Reimer uses extensive foreign records, secondary sources, and *mahkama*, it is curious that these last records were not used to discuss the most important element, certainly the majority of the population who hardly make a showing throughout the book, either before or after the beginning of the 19th century. Yet the Alexandrian archival record dating from the Ottoman period is very rich and raises many questions about how the city has been studied, including the general acceptance of how small its population was at the end of the 18th century. Labor conflict with European capital and the growth of crime in the city are well documented in the Zabtiyya records, which cover Alexandria extensively for the second part of the century. I recommend this book to those interested in Egyptian history, for use in classrooms discussing colonial cities, and for students of Mediterranean history in general.

MAHMUD A. FAKSH, *The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997). Pp. 148. \$49.95 cloth.

MAHMOOD MONSHIPOURI, *Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Pp. 270. \$55.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY QUINTAIN WIKTOROWICZ, Claremont, N.H.

Middle Eastern studies is frequently criticized in the social sciences for being atheoretical and descriptive. While it is effective in elucidating the complexities of societies, a lack of theory tends to isolate Middle Eastern studies from social-science disciplines, because it often lacks applicable frameworks or concepts that can be applied outside the region. A growing group of scholars is attempting to address this concern by integrating strong empirical area expertise and the rigor of social-science inquiry to enhance the explanatory power of research.

Mahmood Monshipouri in *Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East* recognizes the utility of such an approach when he notes, “Although an increasing number of studies have focused on Islamic revivalism, theoretical—that is systematic and comparative—treatments of the topic are desperately needed” (p. 24). Heeding his own observation, his book attempts to provide a theoretically informed assessment of the struggle between Islamism and secularism and its impact on political and economic reform. He argues that the portrayal of Islamists and secularists as engaged in an irreconcilable struggle for dominance in society is misleading. Such a “clash of civilizations” perspective ignores commonalities between their underlying ethical systems. Whereas secularism stresses civil and political rights and Islamic ethics emphasizes social justice, both share a concern with human dignity. Monshipouri argues that a convergence of these two perspectives will enhance prospects for human rights in the Middle East by combining concern with the protection of individual freedom with an ethical

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emphasis on socio-economic and cultural rights. Case studies of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran are used to examine the interactions between Islamism and secularism and their effect on human-rights issues, such as the protection of minorities, the rights of women, and the universalization of human-rights doctrine. In the process, Monshipouri points to possibilities for a convergence of secular rationalism and Islamist social ethics.

While this perspective provides fresh insights into possibilities for the reconciliation of divergent ethical systems in the area of human rights, a central theoretical approach often seems absent, despite the author's claims to the contrary. He offers an eclectic blend of several paradigms of Islamic revivalism in the first chapter, but does not fully explain which elements he is using from each theoretical approach and why. As a result, his theoretical contribution is obfuscated and is meekly represented in the various case studies. In addition, the case studies themselves tend toward descriptive (rather than theoretical or comparative) analysis, at times devolving into summaries of the "state of affairs" in each country and losing analytical appeal. Although the author attempts to compare the case studies in the final chapter, the more descriptive approach renders it a "comparative description" rather than a "comparative analysis" (which would explain the causes of similarities and differences). Despite these criticisms, Monshipouri's book is worthwhile for its innovative approach to the struggle between Islamism and secularism, and although the theoretical approach is uneven, it certainly represents a commendable step in the right direction.

Mahmud A. Faksh's *The Future of Islam in the Middle East* outlines the potential of the Islamist challenge in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. The central theme of the book is that the socio-economic and political failures of modernization policies in the Arab world engendered unmet expectations and concomitant frustration with incumbent regimes, which led to increased support for Islamism. In making this argument, Faksh reiterates positions and themes that are already ubiquitous in the literature, without adequately analyzing the merits and limitations of other possible explanations. The dangers of ignoring alternative theories become readily apparent as one moves through the empirical chapters and notes the absence of important information and alternative perspectives that challenge the author's claims.

In the first chapter, Faksh outlines common ideological themes in Islamist thought by summarizing the contributions of Maudidi, Qutb, and Khomeini. In doing so, however, he emphasizes commonalities while ignoring the importance of differences. There is a rich and complex debate about many of the concepts and issues the author takes as given (especially jihad). In these debates, Islamists are not simply parroting earlier themes or thinkers; there are new and important changes in discourse that are influencing the direction of Islamic activism. It is these debates and differences, not simply commonalities, that will shape the future of Islam in the Middle East.

The book then moves on to explain the popular appeal of Islam, and it is here that one finds the most serious weaknesses. The chapter echoes the classic relative deprivation argument for mass mobilization: "the rising expectations that accompanied the onset of modernization have been crushed by harsh socioeconomic realities" (p. 28). Reflecting early frustration-aggression theories, there is an implicit argument here that these frustrations, in turn, lead to the use of violence. The author goes so far as to argue that poverty is "at the base of the surge in Islamic violence" (p. 28), and later in the case study on Egypt asserts that "the fundamentalists are far from disappearing and will probably go on committing intermittent acts of violence, especially in the medium term, because socioeconomic conditions remain intractable" (p. 56). This is a strong assertion for which the author provides no data or evidence. Students of social movements, revolutions, rebellions, and general political violence would certainly take issue with such a simple linkage. Whereas poverty is ubiquitous, the use of political violence is not. Research has indicated that other factors explain the use of political violence, including government policy toward the movement, opportunities, availability of resources, and strategic consid-

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erations. All of these possibilities enjoy substantial empirical support, yet the author never explores any alternative theories to his narrow deprivation argument. Although socio-economic or political failure and frustration may create fodder for revolt, there are other important factors that need to be explored. A few of these issues are briefly recognized in the footnotes, but they are not adequately addressed and deserve more prominence in the analysis.

In making such an argument, Faksh limits the role of ideas to a convenient idiom rooted in a common cultural discourse. Islam as a system of ideas is relegated to a residual category of cultural commonalities used for resistance and opposition. Again, there is no theoretical justification for such an approach. Not only has research on rebellion and revolution recently pointed to the importance of ideas in collective action (beyond simply a shared, legitimate language of protest), but Islamists themselves also believe in the mobilizing power of ideas, independent of economic circumstances. While economic or political conditions certainly may make people more willing to listen to alternative ideologies, there is no determinative link, and the author would have to provide at least a modicum of support to eliminate the ideational side of protest. In addition, there is an implicit assumption that reasons for belonging to or supporting Islamism never alter. Yet even if individuals are initially drawn to the Islamist cause because of relative deprivation, this may change. It is difficult to question the religious conviction of many Islamists, irrespective of any possible fluctuations in deprivation.

In the end, the absence of engagement with theoretical debates that examine alternative explanations undermines the author's assertion that "[t]he lure of Islamism will continue to exist as long as there are these economic reasons" (p. 30). The book provides a good example of why theoretical engagement is necessary for accurate inquiry in area studies research. Too many assumptions without rigorous theoretical dialogue and empirical testing weaken its premises. Although Faksh's work may offer background information for students, like many such books it does not contribute anything new to scholarship.

PIROUZ MOJTAAHED-ZADEH, *Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf. A Maritime Political Geography* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999). Pp. 298. \$75.00.

REVIEWED BY HOUCANG HASSAN-YARI, Department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario

If the number of annual international conferences on a subject is an indicator of its importance for the academic and the political worlds, there is no doubt that security in the Persian Gulf region is one of the most debated topics. The area has always been coveted by non-indigenous adventurers. The Portuguese presence in the region was followed by a lasting British dominance, which, in turn, would be dislodged by a new American military, political, cultural, and economic leadership. This historical foreign intervention coupled with emerging political independent entities—that is, states—has created a confrontational dynamic in the region based on territorial lines of demarcation.

Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh is one of the scholars with a great interest in this topic. He opens his *Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf* with a warning: "There are many areas of border dispute in the region of the Persian Gulf as potentially explosive as that of the Kuwait crisis of 1990–91" (p. ix). In the Preface, the author provides a panoply of unsettled territorial and border disputes in the Persian Gulf region. In other words, he focuses his research on the study of territoriality and boundary differences in the maritime areas. The author chooses to study in more detail the rampant dispute between Iran and the UAE over the ownership of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, and the conflicting claims made by Qatar and Bahrain to a number of islands and shoals.

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The Introduction lays down a theoretical bed upon which the author develops his thesis. In regard to the interaction of geography and politics, Mojtahed-Zadeh is dealing with two different approaches—namely, political geography and geopolitics. He refers to Peter Taylor, Jean Gottmann, and Saul B. Cohen, who has provided perhaps the most comprehensible account of the global hierarchy system, to define the principal concept of his thesis of territory, boundaries, and geopolitical regions.

The first chapter, “The Persian Gulf,” assesses the inter-Arab territorial disputes and the Arab–Iranian territorial differences. In order to overcome their security-related problems, all countries of the Persian Gulf are condemned to obey geographic dictates. “The ideal arrangement for security in the region,” the author emphasizes, “would be a system that includes all littoral states and excludes all extra-regional countries.” It seems that the Persian Gulf states are very far from such an ideal system. Many of them continue to rely on non-indigenous forces for protection against real or imagined malicious intentions of their neighbors. At the moment, pre-requisites for the creation of such a system are absent.

Chapter 2, “The Strait of Hormuz,” studies the geographical situation of a number of Iranian islands located strategically in the Strait of Hormuz to provide a better appreciation of Iranian strategy in the 1970s—that is, to protect and keep open the vital waterway. Iran’s geopolitical relations, before and after the 1979 Revolution, with Oman, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other GCC state members are examined in detail. Mojtahed-Zadeh shows the increasing cooperation with Iran of some of the region’s Arab countries, citing this as a good indicator of how geographical factors are working in favor of growing Arab–Iranian relations in the Persian Gulf. Recent warming relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors is another indication of this slow improvement in bilateral relations in the area.

The ethnic origin of the Persian Gulf region’s population and the Iranian connection are investigated in Chapter 3. Referring to history books, the author establishes Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf coasts in the mid-6th century B.C. under Achaemenians. It is only in the early 6th century A.D. that Arab immigrants from the interior of Arabia were established in Oman; they were called *Mazun* or *Masun* in the period of Iranian rule (p. 64). “The first Arab conquest in the Gulf took place at the time of Omar, the second Rashidin Caliph” (p. 67). An Iranian population was also present in other southern coastal regions of the Persian Gulf. Today, these people are known as Arabs. Iran’s traditional position in the Persian Gulf suffered a deadly blow with Nader Shah’s assassination in 1747. The Iranian decline coincided with the British Empire’s arrival in the region. London reorganized the regional map by defining territories and boundaries within the emirates and by making independent political entities of these tribal units.

The announced intention of the British (in January 1968) to withdraw its presence from the region created a sense of urgency for the Gulf states to settle their outstanding territorial and boundary differences. Chapter 4, “Maritime Boundaries in the Persian Gulf,” presents an extensive review of the international body of literature on the laws concerning maritime areas of littoral states and how Iran and its Arab neighbors formulated their claims in dividing the continental-shelf boundaries of the Persian Gulf, their coastal lines, the seabed resources, exclusive fisheries zones, etc. The existence of oil and gas gives another dimension to the territorial and boundary question in the Persian Gulf. Mojtahed-Zadeh analyzes the six continental-shelf boundaries between Bahrain–Saudi Arabia, Iran–Saudi Arabia, Qatar–Iran, Iran–Bahrain, Qatar–UAE, and Iran–Oman. He shows how difficult the task of negotiating teams would be in the absence of goodwill to overcome their differences. By contrast, Iran and Saudi Arabia settled their territorial claims through mutual understanding and political will.

Chapter 5, “Emergence and Evolution of Territorial States in Qatar and Bahrain,” studies the ongoing territorial disputes between Bahrain and Qatar over the ownership of the Hawar archipelago and Zubarah until their independence. Bahrain’s modern history (after Iran leased it to

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the Sultan of Mascut in 1811) consists of a succession of confrontations among the al-Khalifah family, Mascutis, Egyptians (in the name of Ottomans), Wahhabis, and British. To secure the Iranian authorities' support against the British, a Bahraini ruler wrote two letters in 1860 reiterating that "the people of Bahrain are subjects of the Government of Iran" (p. 124). The emergence of the state of Qatar as it is tied to the history of the al-Thani family under British protection; Iran's continued claims of sovereignty over Bahrain; and the geographical dimensions of the disputes are other subjects of this chapter, which cites a number of recently disclosed confidential documents from the British Foreign Office. These valuable documents reveal that Muhammad Reza Shah was contemplating the withdrawal of Iran's claim to Bahrain as early as 1965–66—at least four years earlier than the claim was officially withdrawn (p. 134).

Historical territorial disputes between Bahrain and Qatar would survive both countries rise to statehood. Chapter 6 examines the sentimental value of Zubarah (today part of Qatar)—*fer de lance* for the al-Khalifah family in their conquest of Bahrain. Nothing has deterred Bahrain's claim—neither GCC association nor two successive wars in the immediate neighborhood. British oil interests in the region have aggravated inter-Arab relations in the Persian Gulf.

Chapter 7, "Iran–UAE Territorial and Boundary Disputes," discusses another hot spot in the azure waters of the Persian Gulf. It may also be the most complicated dispute, if the ethnic dimension of the question is taken into consideration. In this chapter, the author meticulously presents a profile of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa. Moreover, the geographical position of the islands and their proximity to Iran and the UAE, their population and history since the emergence of the state of Iran and of the emirates, and, finally, Britain's recognition of Iran's undisputed sovereignty over the islands are studied in fine detail.

Chapter 8 deals with "Recent Developments." The uneasy Iran–UAE cohabitation in Abu Musa was put to the test in April 1992, when the Iranian authorities prevented a group of non-nationals (that is, people who were not native to the emirates) from entering the disputed island (p. 175). The path of the bilateral territorial dispute widened when GCC called on Iran to "terminate its occupation [of the islands] which belonged to the United Arab Emirates" (p. 177) during its December 1992 summit. A few years later, the Arab League called the Iran–UAE quarrel an Arab–Iran multilateral dispute.

Chapter 9, "Legal and Historical Arguments," analyzes this dispute. Citing British and historical sources, Mojtahed-Zadeh refutes the UAE's arguments concerning their claim of ownership of the three islands. These arguments are "priority in occupation, prior control, Arab origins of the population, Iran's late claim, nineteenth-century correspondence, dual legal status, the factor of prescription, *duress*, and temporary administrative arrangement." He then looks at the history of Iran's claim to the Tunbs and Abu Musa and shows how fear of Russian encroachment in the Persian Gulf was used by Britain as a pretext to occupy the Iranian islands of the Strait of Hormuz, the source of today's territorial disputes.

The last chapter covers "Seizure of the Two Tunbs and Restoration of Sovereignty in Abu Musa." Here, too Mojtahed-Zadeh relies heavily on historical documents mainly from the dominant power in the region: the British government. He closes his analysis in the Conclusion by proposing that the Persian Gulf states rethink their strategies in light of a changing world and the necessity to prepare to face the challenges of new global geopolitical realities. In order to succeed in this enterprise, Arabs and Iranians should create regional political–economic structures for cooperation and put an end to their territorial and other disputes. He proposes other confidence-building measures and favors a real integration of countries of the Persian Gulf region and the Caspian Sea basin in the absence of intervention by the big powers.

Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf has rich appendixes containing valuable documents. The author has effectively used relevant collected materials by putting them in the service of a sound scholarly approach. The book contains a rich bibliography citing many documents in the original languages of the decision-makers, by actors who were directly in-

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volved in the region. Its numerous maps are very useful. The author has tried to be fair in his analysis and presents a balanced thesis, a counter-argument, on a very contentious topic. Moj-tahed-Zadeh's book is a contribution to the field and provides a better understanding of security in the Persian Gulf from the standpoint of a political-territorial dynamic.

IZZUD-DIN PAL, *Pakistan, Islam and Economics: Failure of Modernity* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999). Pp. 195.

REVIEWED BY ROBERT E. LOONEY, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

This excellent study offers a critical analysis of the Islamic economic system, particularly as it has evolved in Pakistan after being defined by the traditional ulma and embellished by various Islamic economists. It is a pioneering effort to present a comprehensive view of the issues involved, from *riba* to the status of women in Islam. These issues are encompassed in a broader discussion of the country's identity: was Pakistan to be an Islamic state or a Muslim state?

Throughout the book, one senses this is a very personal work, with the author's voice literally coming out of the pages. Although he is clearly sympathetic to the modernists, he still does a masterly, objective job of drawing out their differences with the traditionalists. In this regard, his views are both controversial and insightful, as he critiques the arguments of Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi and Dr. Anwar Iqbal Qureshi as representatives of the mainstream theory and of Fazalur Rehman and Syed Yaqub Shas as the proponents of the modern interpretation of *riba*.

Overall, the study is concerned with religious thought in Islam from an economic point of view. The continuing ideological push to establish a truly Islamic state in Pakistan raises the question about reinterpretation of Qur'anic moral pronouncements and injunctions. This issue is not unique to Pakistan, although the country's geography and historical experience has created a somewhat unusual situation in this regard.

The book focuses on juristic arguments and on the modernist perspective on these arguments. Here the author uses the word "modernist" in a broad sense to include all those who believe that the laws and institutions developed during the medieval period of Islam are not immutable. Specifically, this group contends that Islamic modernism embraces those Muslims who believe that the Qur'anic versus should be examined in the context of the social framework in which they were revealed and their message reconstituted in the light of modern times.

Three institutions are generally considered essential to establishing the Islamic economic system: the elimination of *riba*, the implementation of the laws of inheritance, and the organization of the *zakat*. The author contends, however, that the central point of Islamization in Pakistan has been the issue of *riba*. No similar zeal has been shown by the proponents of Islamicization for an assessment of the workings of the laws of inheritance or about the perceived or real problems relating to *zakat*. This obsessive focus on the reward to capital is not matched by a regard for fair compensation that ought to be earned by labor. Further, Izzud-Din Pal contends that Islamicists in Pakistan define the concept of *riba* in a very narrow and a rigid manner, and they expect the entire economic system to be changed to correspond to their criteria. In this regard, their position is completely out of line in the context of the Muslim world as a whole.

The author provides a general sketch of how this situation came to pass. It is his contention that immediately after independence, the politicians adopted a constitutional approach to the demand to establish an Islamic state, hoping to diffuse pressure from the ulma, but they made a solemn declaration that they envisaged a country in which Muslims would be free to build their lives in accordance with Islam. Perhaps they had considerable confidence in their ability to exercise an ambidextrous strategy, and each hoped that this strategy would see him through

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his term of office. Or perhaps the politicians expected that some kind of Islamic modernism would evolve in the long run and resolve this conflict for them. They were not men of vision, and they had no courage of their convictions. In order to develop and foster modernist thought, it was necessary to establish a framework for free and open discussion, accepting and tolerating dissent. It was imperative that teaching and research at universities be diligently promoted. No serious effort was made in this direction. When General Zia ul-Haq came to power, he found ample opportunity to turn the perfervid rhetoric about Islamicization to his advantage.

The emergence of Islamic economics during the 1970s and 1980s was based on the position of the traditionalist ulama concerning economic issues such as interest-free banking, the religious tax of *zakat*, and the laws of inheritance as established and interpreted by the classical jurists. The objective was to provide a framework for the legitimate activities of pious Muslim entrepreneurs working toward the creation of what was called the Islamic welfare economy. Through this new literature—although it was molded in juristic vocabulary—it became possible to hinder the cause of modernism in the country. What has in fact emerged is a phenomenon familiar in Muslim history: that of economic factors responding to the challenge of Islamic reforms by means of subterfuge.

The study concludes with a discussion of problems associated with the divergence between words and deeds that has developed as a persistent phenomenon in Pakistan. It stems from the assumption that the state is responsible for implementing Islam as a complete code of life. But it creates a paradox. The individual is expected to submit to the will of God voluntarily in order to be pious. The will of God, however, is expressed not through exaltation of personal faith in action, but through the state regulating his life.

Izzud-Din Pal is to be commended for making a series of rich and important issues and writings (many in Urdu) accessible to a wide audience. His book should be on the shelf of anyone wishing a clear, concise contrast of Islamic economics with that of the Neo-Classicals. In addition, as an informative and critical assessment of the endeavors made to Islamize the system, the book will be a welcome addition to the body of literature available on the economy of Pakistan.

HOOMAN PEIMANI, *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998). Pp. 165.

REVIEWED BY A. WILLIAM SAMII, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., Prague

Hooman Peimani, a consultant with United Nations agencies in Geneva and an independent researcher on the Middle East, West Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, has written an ambitious work based on the premise that the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) share geographical, societal, political, economic, and military factors, combined with common concerns. These commonalities mean that the individual states are linked so closely that their national-security concerns cannot be considered independently. Thus, one has a “security complex” in which there is interdependence, rivalry, and shared interests.

The book is about the efforts of Russia, Iran, and Turkey to fill the vacuum left in Central Asia by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Peimani’s underlying hypothesis is that the Soviet collapse led to the creation of a Central Asia security complex, and as this security complex distanced itself from a Russocentric orbit, it considered and rejected a Turkey-oriented one and “finally shifted towards an Iran-oriented complex” (p. 4). Iran, Turkey, and Russia, Peimani explains, are still competing to include Central Asia in their respective security complexes.

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Chapter 4 of the book discusses societal factors in the rivalry for a strong regional presence. One would have thought that common ethnic, linguistic, and religious factors would have led to a natural connection between Turkey and the Central Asian states. The book notes that Persian has remained the preferred cultural language in terms of prestige and richness, and even now, when Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan have adopted the Latin alphabet officially, practical efforts to replace Cyrillic have not gotten very far. This Pan-Turkic drive has not gotten far because the Central Asians do not want to see the emergence of a Turkish “big brother,” because they fear a Russian backlash, and because Iran and Russia oppose creation of a Pan-Turkic political-economic structure.

Russian influence in the region will continue because of the presence of Russian minorities in all of the Central Asian states and because Russian is the regional lingua franca. Iran and the regional states have some common ethnic and linguistic factors, but this is not crucial for Iran because its geopolitical position provides “sufficient influence to make it a major factor in Central Asia” (p. 53). All the same, Iran is trying to make cultural inroads through music and television broadcasts. Also, thousands of Central Asians (from youngsters to government officials) have received scholarships to study in Iran, the book notes.

The fifth chapter of the book deals with the military dimension. China, the reader learns, “will probably be a long-term source of external threat to Central Asia,” mainly because of its proximity and shared borders (p. 67). There also is concern over ethnic issues: the Muslim Uighurs in China may one day consider seceding and joining Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, while there is concern in Kazakhstan over the future of illegal Chinese immigrants who have settled there.

Russia’s long-term plans, the presence of Russian minorities in all of the regional states, and Russia’s increasingly nationalistic sentiments also cause concern in Central Asia. The book states that Russia is concerned about the impact of independence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as about the rise of nationalist movements, on its own minorities. The degree of Islamic radicalism in the region, therefore, has been exaggerated by the Russian leadership, while regional leaders have also exaggerated the problem in order to suppress signs of dissent.

Russia has maintained its military influence in Central Asia through a number of security pacts that address border-patroling and peace-keeping. Through bilateral agreements, furthermore, “Russia has practically ensured the dependence of the region in almost every area of military security activities” (p. 77). The Russians’ actual capacity for maintaining influence in the region is somewhat limited by its weak economy, Central Asian determination to maintain independence, and Russia’s reluctance and inability to get involved in “broad and massive military engagements” (p. 80). The current Chechnya quagmire makes one question this last point. Iran essentially defers to Russia, according to the book, viewing Central Asia as Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Turkey’s role in Central Asian security affairs “has been negligible and will certainly remain so in the foreseeable future,” due to distance, economic and military restrictions, and a desire to avoid provoking Russia, Peimani writes. This situation has changed, with the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and therefore NATO (of which Turkey is a member) becoming active in the region. And the PFP deals with a variety of military topics, from air defense to defense procurement and peacekeeping. The GUUAM alliance, which has Uzbekistan as a member, also has a distinct Western and NATO orientation.

Turning to economic matters in the sixth chapter, the book states that a weak economy precludes any Russian efforts to dominate the region. Relations with Iran, however, are likely to grow through bilateral and multilateral agreements and through multilateral bodies, such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Caspian Sea Cooperation Organization (CSCO). Although it was introduced in 1992, the CSCO does not seem to have accomplished

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much since Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi urged the creation of a “Caspian Sea littoral states cooperation council” at a June 1999 seminar in Tehran.

The book also discusses economic activities by other countries, such as China and the Arab Persian Gulf states, in the region. The prediction that Pakistan will affect Central Asian economies in the long term seems to be coming true—witness the 15 May discussions in Ashgabat between Pakistani ruler General Pervez Musharraf and Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov about a 1,600-kilometer gas pipeline from the Dauletabad fields in Turkmenistan’s south to the central Pakistani city of Multan.

The conclusion states that the Central Asian security complex has shifted toward an Iranian orientation, and although regional rulers are suspicious of Iran, they are convinced that it is not a threat. Iranian support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may undermine such convictions. Although trade and economic ties between Central Asia and Iran are growing, moreover, this is hardly the case in the security arena. Indeed, Western influence in the region is growing in the military and security fields.

The amount and quality of research that has gone into this work is noteworthy. The author has used books and journal articles by recognized experts on regional studies, Russian- and Persian-language newspapers, and more unusual works that are available mainly through translation services. There seems to be an unusual willingness to accept the statements of government officials at face value, however. The reader is told, for example, that “Iran declared impartiality in the Tajik civil war and stressed that Iran has no desire to export revolution to Tajikistan” (p. 32). Indeed, Tehran makes similar statements about most places in the world, but a comparison of Iranian-supported subversion in Turkey and espionage in Azerbaijan with Iranian denials and accusations makes one suspect that Tehran is not always being completely forthright.

This work suffers from two other faults. The first of these is the natural result of writing a book about current events, particularly as they relate to developing countries. By the time the research is done, the book is written and published, and it is finally reviewed, many factors change. Thus, the degree of self-congratulation that slips into the Preface when the author notes that the book’s main argument is strengthened by two new energy agreements that increased Iran’s role in the Central Asian energy industry is misplaced. That may have appeared to be the case in 1998, when the book was published. By March 2000, however, it seemed that Iran’s potential role in the regional energy market was weakening. Turkmenistan was playing Iran and Russia against each other; it was playing both countries off the U.S. in an attempt to get improved financial terms for the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would compete with any Iranian route. Iranian efforts to enlist Russian support, through Gazprom, in development of natural resources seemed increasingly unwise because they are competitors and because Gazprom is suffering its own financial problems.

The other fault is the attempt to over-intellectualize the work by placing events within a theoretical model or framework. Peimani writes that “no serious attempt at constructing a theoretical framework for the study of regional security has been made.” He notes, in Chapter 2, that Barry Buzan’s concept of the security complex is appropriate for studying Central Asia. How great a contribution this discussion makes to the overall quality or value of the work is unclear. The book could have stood on the merits of its research and writing without such a diversion.

Nor is one dealing just with the five Central Asian states and the three competitors (Iran, Turkey, and Russia.) One is also dealing with a number of non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and international security organizations (NATO and the OSCE). All of these external factors preclude the creation of a very accurate model, and any theoretical framework that ignores them will not be very accurate. Theory-building, further, depends on predictability and rational actors. When dealing with Iran, one encounters rationality, but with

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very different values and tactics to achieve the desired ends. This, too, makes prediction, with or without models and theories, very difficult.

The reviewer believes that this book would have been interesting in 1998, when it was published. But it has not lasted well due to the dynamic nature of Central Asian affairs. One would do better to track regional affairs through the study of periodicals.

ALON PELED, *A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower in Multiethnic States* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University Press, 1998). Pp. 230.

REVIEWED BY OREN BARAK, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

This book contributes to the growing fields of ethnic studies and military thought; it is also of interest to students of the contemporary Middle East.

Until recently, multi-ethnic armies—like pluralist, or divided, states—were undifferentiated from military institutions in “nation-states.” However, the hardships encountered by several of these institutions in times of internal strife (e.g., in Cyprus during the 1960s, Lebanon since the mid-1970s, and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s) or when faced with external challenges (e.g., the Iraqi army during the early 1990s) highlighted their significance and have prompted scholars to reconsider their structure and socio-political role. This renewed interest falls into line not only with the heated debate on power-sharing formulas in pluralist societies, which has been going on since the late 1960s, but also with the growing recognition among social scientists and historians that military institutions reflect their respective societies and may therefore serve as “social laboratories” for their study. In addition, armies are appreciated as constituting one of the primary instruments employed by modern states to mold together members with different religious, linguistic, and socio-economic backgrounds and turn them into loyal and patriotic citizens.

Peled’s goal is twofold. First, he lays theoretical groundwork in the field of military institutions in multi-ethnic states; then he presents a thorough analysis of several case studies that demonstrate the main problem confronting these armies: how to integrate members of the various ethnic groups in the state, and in particular those “whose loyalty is questioned by the government or by the general public” (p. xiii), so that these institutions can carry out their duties without falling apart. With some reservations, he attains this goal in the book.

The book starts with a brief account of the virtual disintegration of the Yugoslavian and Iraqi armies in the early 1990s, and closes with lessons drawn from the breakdown of the military in Rwanda in 1994. But its main chapters are dedicated to three intriguing case studies of multi-ethnic armies: those of South Africa, Singapore, and Israel. In each case, the changing patterns of integration and exclusion of members of ethnic groups into the military through recruitment, training, integration, and promotion are presented in a clear and insightful manner. This is done by combining historical narrative, theoretical analysis, and comparative perspective. In my view, the most interesting finding in this part is that from the early 1960s, many years before the formal abolition of apartheid in South Africa, members of the non-white communities were recruited by its armed forces (SADF), first as soldiers, then as officers. This, Peled argues, was due to several factors: the country’s political and military leaders came to recognize that demographic shifts were not in the favor of the white community, and the challenges confronting the SADF—particularly counter-guerrilla warfare—were too immense to be dealt with successfully by its members. Hence, members of the SADF’s officer corps, which had become more professional since the early 1960s, gradually moved away from the imperatives of apartheid and showed a growing inclination to launch ethnic-recruiting experiments.

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Conversely, the Singaporean government, dominated by the Chinese community—the majority in the country—had sought to exclude members of the Malay minority from the military since the mid-1960s, fearing that its members would prove disloyal when called to fight their own “brothers” in neighboring Malaysia.

The last case discussed in this book, Israel, reveals mixed results in terms of integration of non-Jewish ethnic groups into the military. Whereas members of the smaller Druze and Circassian communities—as well as some Arab bedouins and Christians—were successfully recruited into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in what Peled describes as a process of “phased integration,” Arab Muslims, the largest non-Jewish community in this state, remain exempt from military service, as well as from “civil national service.” Consequently, members of this group cannot join their fellow countrymen in Israel’s “national melting pot” (p. 128) and are barred from enjoying privileges (e.g., housing, jobs) that are granted only to persons who have completed military service or national service.

Peled’s detailed account of the three cases is remarkable given the obstacles that confront this kind of research: the sensitivity of ethnic issues, particularly with regard to military affairs, and the tendency of leaders of multi-ethnic states and their formal institutions to refrain from discussing the existence of “ethnic problems.” As Peled points out in his Introduction, data concerning the ethnic composition of the military is often withheld by the authorities, who fear that its publication will upset the internal balance. The military has apprehensions that an open discussion of these matters will compromise its professional and ethnically neutral image, and ethnic leaders themselves fear that “the status and promotion of their youth in the military will suffer a setback if the public becomes aware that the state is putting arms into the hands of allegedly disloyal ethnic groups” (p. xiv).

The author overcomes these methodological hurdles by drawing on official publications, archival material, and newspapers, as well as on interviews conducted with more than one hundred high-ranking officials in the three states. However, although this last method of inquiry does indeed yield insights into the cases in question, learning about historical events from persons directly involved in them has its own drawbacks. We learn about the views of military officers *post factum* and from their own recollection, and thus they appear to us as far-sighted “professionals”—distant from their civilian masters, who are forever ridden with political ambitions and considerations. Yet this impression is questionable. In the case of Israel, for instance, generals frequently—and at times, automatically—make statesmen.

Another important point to be made is that all cases discussed represent “multiethnic states in which society is ethnically stratified and ethnic groups are hierarchically ranked” (p. 10)—that is, they are states in which one ethnic group dominates the political system and the others are subordinated to it. However, many multi-ethnic states are unranked or only partially ranked, and their military institutions differ from the cases analyzed here. In South Africa, Singapore, and Israel, decision-making with regard to recruitment, training, integration, and promotion is the sole privilege of the dominant groups (whites, Chinese, and Jews, respectively), who can balance their perceived threat from other groups with “objective” needs to recruit fresh conscripts from among their members. Yet in unranked or partially ranked multi-ethnic states (e.g., Yugoslavia, Belgium, Canada, Lebanon), these decisions are the product of political consensus among *all* ethnic groups, who constantly demand their rightful share in the army, as they do with regard to the other institutions of the state. There, the road to inclusion lies not in unilateral decisions by the dominant ethnic group but, rather, in a seemingly endless process of bargaining, trade-offs, and, above all, power-sharing formulas. What we have here, then, is a pioneering, penetrating, and illuminating inquiry into important dilemmas of military institutions in *some* multi-ethnic states, but not a comprehensive and up-to-date work that encompasses the many facets of this fascinating subject.

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FARIBA ADELKHAH, *Being Modern in Iran*, trans. Jonathan Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press and Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, 2000). Pp. 204.

REVIEWED BY FARIDEH FARHI, Middle East Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii

In recent years, there has been a plethora of commentary, at times revised daily, regarding the nature of factional conflicts and the marketplace of ideas that elite competition has brought into the open in Iran. Much less analyzed or thoughtfully reflected upon are the kinds of subtle changes that have occurred in different layers of the society that allow Iranians to breathe meaning into, and make sense of, the fast pace of changes at the political top, and to fuel those changes. Precisely how Iranians have fashioned, and are fashioning, their daily life—or, as Adelkhah puts it, “reinventing their modern life”—is the tantalizing focus of this very interesting, albeit rather scattered and cumbersome, book about Iranian culture and politics.

Adelkhah's stated intent is to explore the interaction between the institutionalization of the Islamic Republic and changes in Iranian society, as appropriated and continuously re-created at the level of popular culture. Using fieldwork begun in the early 1990s, she does this by examining the interplay of broader modernizing forces—rationalization, secularization, commercialization, and increased differentiation of various societal spheres—with the continual adaptation of different lifestyles in which Iranians engage today. The approach or stated intention is to stay away from the routine dichotomization of state and society, which conceptualizes one side of the dichotomy as backward and repressive and the other as progressive and benign. Instead, the attempt is to focus on the “real public space,” or overlapping space—the common ground between the two—that is being created and re-created on a daily basis through public imagination, use of reason, and acts of production and consumption, as well as governmental policies.

This ambitious intention is perhaps the reason for the discursive character of the book. In fact, readers searching for a theme or set of themes that can encapsulate the complexity and diversity on which Adelkhah is attempting to shed light will ultimately leave the book ungratified. There are simply too many things going on here and far too many casual generalizations about everyday life in Iran. After all, capturing the flavor of a changing culture, in all its variegated improvisations, is not something that can be easily done—or that is usually endeavored. Yet there is still much to be valued in this book in terms of ideas and direction for further research that it may well generate.

Adelkhah begins her analysis with “lifestyles.” She rejects the notion of tradition as something located in the past or to be overcome and, instead, examines its continuous improvisation in real life. For instance, with the emergence of the public and publicity, she argues, the traditional ethic and legacy of the *javanmard* (translated as “man of integrity”) interacts with more modern demands of a “social being” committed to others in a public fashion and turns into a civic trait. The point is that Iranian society becomes “modern,” or reinvents its difference, not by abandoning what it has but by coming to terms with increased publicity. The modern reincarnation of *javanmard* instills the idea of giving to public life into a variety of historical contexts and to a very diverse set of individuals who can express it. As a lifestyle, the *javanmard* ethos also becomes a mechanism for building and asserting the modern (male?) self as defined by the particularities of the Iranian context.

But modernity is not merely about the assertion of the self; it is also about bureaucratization, rationalization, commercialization, and even democratization. In order to make her point, Adelkhah traverses far and wide and finds evidence of public space in rationalization and bureaucratization of more and more of daily life, modernization and commercialization of the religious sphere, the appetite for sports among all categories of people, the birth of urban culture, the stress on individual autonomy and, at the same time, on respect for laws and regulations. A

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particularly interesting discussion centers on the rationalizing, individualizing, and commercializing processes in the religious sphere. For instance, this discussion sheds light on how religious meetings, helped by the development of the media, have become an individualized space where reactions are expected, whereas before one attended such meetings above all to listen.

The book ends with a return to the discussion of the “Iranian” self. Using Anthony Giddens’s notion of “life politics,” Adelkhah offers many examples as a means to examine the role competitive practices play in Iranian society’s shift into the realm of explicit calculations and its use of ability and knowledge as agents of change. The existence of multiple venues of action allows the modern social self to make choices according to contexts. And these choices are not situated exclusively in relationship to constant and stable identity resources—Persianness, local culture, Islamic principles—provided for all. The modern self works on these resources constantly, sometimes even referring to newer or foreign sources of identity. Subjectivity is carved from composite elements, both unconsciously and through active use of critical faculties. The government, of course, heavily promotes regulated competition, but it is the Iranian public’s increasing use of “self-reflexivity” (also borrowed from Giddens) that makes individuals highly selective appropriators of what is presented to them in the public arena. This is how choice is integrated into individual lives, and this is where constant negotiation occurs between private and public, as well as between individual and society. And, in Adelkhah’s words, this is ultimately where Iranians end up creating “a form of modernity that is their own.”

This is not an easy book to read for either of its presumed audiences: Iran specialists and anthropologists. Iran specialists will be frustrated by Adelkhah’s liberal reliance on concepts developed within other contexts and offered here without much explanation or interrogation. Along with anthropologists, they will also be troubled by the literal barrage of generalizations, many of which are taken for granted, as opposed to buttressed by evidence. The following example, I think, shows the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the book: In her discussion of increased commercialization and institutionalization of the religious sphere, Adelkhah makes a flat assertion that there is a “vast movement” all over the country to institutionalize shrines that finds its energy mostly from the mass of the faithful. She does not give the reader any evidence about what constitutes this “vast movement.” Further, she does not elaborate on the nature of this institutionalization and precisely how this process is changing the character of social interactions around the shrines. Of course, none of these shortcomings prevents her from offering the fascinating—and, I think, ultimately valid—conclusion that the process of conferring sacredness “from below” in practice makes it impossible for political authorities to impose complete centralization on the religious sphere. Instead, it allows for interaction among different religious agents and the emergence of a yet another public space. This worthy observation begs more detailed analysis, something that one hopes will be done by Adelkhah or someone else later. As presented here, it leaves the reader unsatisfied and ultimately confused over the casual manner in which such an important topic is presented.

Another source of frustration can be found in the translation. More common translations of the names of organizations or groups are at times forsaken for the unfamiliar ones, and some words are wrongly translated (e.g., revisions instead of exams; conformists instead of conservatives in some places; empire instead of monarchy). In general, the book could have benefitted from better editing, shorter sentences, and the deletion of repetitive ideas.

Having pointed out some of the drawbacks of the book, it is nevertheless important to reiterate that Adelkhah is attempting to fill a gap in contemporary Iranian studies. She makes an explicit effort to stay away from approaches that explain contemporary politics in Iran in terms only of elite competition or clashes of well-articulated systems of ideas. In addition, the book is full of very interesting observations about and analyses of Iranian popular culture in the post-Revolutionary era—observations and analyses to which this review can in no way do justice,

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and many of which can be points of departure for further discussion. All this makes the book a worthy read, despite its flaws.

DALE F. EICKELMAN AND JON W. ANDERSON, ED., *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999). Pp. 199. \$39.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, Department of Religion, Duke University, Durham, N.C.

The debate about the Internet revolution has been marked by a double dystopia. One comes from the Scandinavian cybernauts who are far more extensively wired than their West European, or even North American, counterparts. In "Digital Arrogance," the Swedish media scholar Andreas Kitzmann laments that the global expansion of multimedia technology and cyber-culture "is motivated not by the promise of human emancipation and enlightenment but by fantasies of power and complete control." The South Asian cultural critic Ziauddin Sardar is even more harsh. "Cyberspace is social engineering of the worst kind. . . . The supposed democracy of cyberspace," he writes in *Cyberfutures* (1996), "only hands control more effectively back to a centralized elite, the ideology of the free citizen making everyone oblivious to the more enduring structures of control."

The other cyber-dystopia is less programmatic than existential. It has been etched by the U.S.–Canadian literary theorist Bill Readings. Technical success, in his view, has forever doomed the prospect of a transparent society—that is, "of a society immediately present to itself in which all members communicate unrestrictedly with all of the others all of the time and without misunderstanding or delay." Why? Because "the development of technologies capable of processing and transmitting information (of 'informationalizing' the world) has expanded so that the speed and range of information exchange exceeds the capacities of the subject who has been destined to master such information" (Readings, *The University in Ruins* [1996], 190–91). Cybernauts are doomed to be frustrated "Netizens"; the Information Super Highway will have more dead ends than useful exits, and it will never have a final destination.

But others who are less deeply afflicted with cyber-psychosis see hope in the randomness and localness and individual nurturing of the Internet. "The primary strength of the Internet," argues Ananda Mitra in "Virtual Commonality" (1997), is its unboundedness: "it provides a forum where there is no ideological closure," or final destination. "Unlike broadcast media, no one is in 'control' of the space and the images of the nation that evolve are constantly metamorphosing."

The authors of this edited volume, two renowned cultural anthropologists, are also preoccupied with images of the nation, and they make an argument that accents the utopian promise rather than the dystopic underside of the information revolution. Not only for Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson but also for most of their contributors, it is a salutary sign that the information revolution has come to the Muslim world, and to particular societies. Though the changes so far are few, and though they affect but a small percentage of Muslims, cybernetics will in time transform not only civil societies, but also the state apparatuses, of many majority–Muslim nations.

The repeated stress is on diversity. The key actors are new interpreters who provide alternative voices and authorities through their participation in the World Wide Web. Internet discourse, according to Anderson, "links people, social networks, and modalities of thought in transnational networks of which they are in part the expression and in part the builders. [What emerges is] a wider body of new interpreters of Islam beyond merely activists." (p. 53)

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Equally diverse is the range of national and regional sites projected in the six case studies that make up the heart of this edited volume. The United States, Indonesia, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Turkey—all are represented in discrete essays that argue about the new media from anthropological perspectives. Some are local, others are national. Some are state-directed, others reflect elements of civil society. Gregory Starrett looks at how new technology and channels of information distribution have created for African American Muslims what he labels “the great chain of buying.” Viewing commerce positively, followers of Imam W. D. Muhammad have used journal advertising to promote products and services that benefit the Islamic Society of North America. Even while maintaining and benefiting from international linkages that focus on the universality and naturalness of Muslim identity, they have created a strong local community attentive to a culturally specific form of knowledge and practice. Theirs is a local instance of e-commerce–cum–spirituality that is independent of political control.

On the other side of the globe, in Indonesia, the case is not local but national, and it is very much state-directed. The Indonesian approach to legal reasoning, ably traced by John Bowen, depends on a notion of abstract law in the public sphere that has to be related to cultural forms of legal argumentation and codification produced and contested in government-edited journals. Very little of this process involves multimedia instruments or cyberspace communications, and it chiefly demonstrates how procrustean any notion of Islamic universalism that invokes Indonesia is.

The other four cases fall between the United States and Indonesia. Walter Armbrust offers a graphic display of comic-strip analysis, showing how a bourgeois, newly capitalized Egyptian urban elite can indulge in media fantasies as a dimension of their newly achieved and much cherished beachside leisure. Islam appears largely in the form of satirized mullahs or veiled women in bikinis, evidencing a freedom from official religious constraints that would seem strange to most readers of mainstream Western media reportage on Egyptian Islam. Maimuna Huq, on the other hand, shows how Islam does not need to appear by name to be culturally coded in Bengali romances. The range of sensitivity about Islamic symbolism extends beyond those creedally defined as Muslims: a Brahmin can write acceptably about Islam, as can a secularist. The deepest code is inchoate. It embraces a sense of honor that includes being a true Muslim but also functioning as a good member of Bengali society and a loyal citizen of Bangladesh.

As interesting as both Armbrust’s and Huq’s essays are, they touch more on popular culture than on the new media. The same cannot be said about White’s and Yavuz’s essays. Both deal with Turkey, and both deal with Turkish television. Because habitual reading is not a widespread practice even in urban Turkey, television assumes a dramatic public role for framing, and controlling, social issues. Even though their ownership is circumscribed and self-serving, Turkey’s 16 national television channels, 15 regional channels, and 300 local channels represent a quantum leap forward from the single national station of the mid-1970s. But has this generated trust? No, argues White, because trust is still generated within local groups, whether formal or informal. Nor have the Alevis and Kurds, two distrusted though locally powerful minorities, been able to succeed through newspapers, radios, or television in Turkey itself. It is the situation of Turks in the European diaspora that has changed the dynamics of communication: in the 1990s, Kurds formed their own television station and parallel World Wide Web site, proliferating broadcasts from Sweden, Germany, and France. The Turkish government has tried to undercut the legitimacy of the station, accusing it of links to the PKK and to drug trafficking, while at the same time establishing its own Kurdish television station.

No one will finish this volume believing that the Muslim world is the next cyber-frontier for the Information Age, but the range of topics and the appeal of local cases suggest that the Internet will play a role in fostering the intermediate speech communities to which Jon Anderson alludes. One would like to have more cases than this book provides—for instance, from

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North Africa and Iran, as well as from Malaysia, but its random testing of Muslim cyberspace already offers liminal hope: the feistiness of Muslim “Netizens” will make even the most dystopic Europeans hesitate to condemn the straightjacketing impact of the Internet in its next phase. It will be a phase with new frontiers and uncharted responses, as it moves cyberspace beyond Europe into parts of Africa and Asia that are already networked but not yet wired to the World Wide Web.

ANDREW SHRYOCK, *Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Society*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies, 23 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Pp. 370.

REVIEWED BY PATRICK D. GAFFNEY, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.

In an era of instantaneous communication and ubiquitous media the global public is regularly invited to witness history in the making, as the expression goes, through newspaper accounts and broadcasts of events marked with special significance. In the Middle East and elsewhere, history is said to record the fate of nations that at times is unfolding before our eyes and ears, with the accuracy of claims resting on evidence to be observed or recovered in period documents and artifacts. What emerges supposedly is a narrative whose eventual uncertainties can be attributed to information gaps, inadequate archives, and difficulties in identifying or authenticating sources.

In this penetrating book, Andrew Shryock sets out to explore this fundamental assumption of modern historiography as it applies to the self-perception and self-presentation of Jordan's tribal past. But what starts out as an effort to collect archaic oral history to elucidate and enlarge upon the few existing European or more recently indigenous Jordanian accounts soon becomes a thoroughly fascinating investigation into the present-day meaning of these memories and their cogent yet paradoxical implications for social and political life within the national community.

Shryock argues that despite massive and rapid change in Jordan, the familiar genealogical idiom of segmentary lineages typical of traditional Arab bedouin social structure continues to provide an essential and versatile foundation for solidarity. However, under prevailing conditions, including recent democratization initiatives, the impulse to convert this tribal heritage into public texts has collided with the discourse of modern citizenship to produce a jumble of reversals and revisions of earlier established inter-tribal status relationships. Moreover, under the keen scrutiny of this ethnographer, the causes and consequences of this collision are examined to reveal a dynamic scene of contestation on the tribal landscape, where performance in the present can vie successfully with facts in the past to generate visions of the future and serve as guides for action.

The book is organized around a set of themes that creatively explores the usefulness of leading theories of ethnohistory (Dirks, Dresch, Messick, Sahlins et al.), although its substance builds on a rich body of data in several genres, from recitations of heroic poetry, reconstructions of ancestral power relationships, the deciphering of tomb inscriptions, and the eliciting of interpretations of early photographs to European travel literature, administrative maps, colonial correspondence, and published local histories. But the thread that unifies the study and enlivens it at every turn is the author's own insightfully self-conscious presence as he presents, describes, and explains the layered significance of this eclectic material.

Shryock often presents his findings accompanied by an understated air of discovery, which effectively re-creates the dramatic tension of his own investigation and subsequent reflection. But this style of exposition has positive methodological implications, as well, because it allows the author to register at critical junctures a growing awareness of how his *persona* as an “external other” prompted particular constructions of the categories of tribal opposition along with

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the commentaries on their origins and relevance. Thus, access to authoritative shaykhs and the information they offer tends to follow a logic of calibrated response in which it is assumed that “textualizing” history inevitably involves “complicity” in the subtle code of an overtly polemical context.

One of the masterly achievements of this study stems from the author’s gift for embracing the contradictions among different versions of the past advanced by descendants of competing groups, followed by his skill at tracing the complex effects that occur when these contrary accounts are published in books rather than handed on verbally among those to whom they belong. As this line of exposition and analysis develops, Shryock draws on illuminating comparisons with problematic nationalist narratives from Europe and the post-colonial realm. But more pointedly, he examines the implications of adapting parochial tribal lore, emphasizing violence and division, to Jordan’s broader legitimacy claims rooted in the Great Arab Revolt, the Hashemite monarchy, and the tangled identity formation of its large Palestinian population.

This expansion of horizons beyond the Balga bedouin territory, where Shryock concentrates his research, introduces a helpful perspective that gives his treatment a resonance that is considerably wider than Middle Eastern anthropology and history. By positioning his sophisticated inquiry at that intersection where the transition from tribe to nation meets the translation from the oral to the textual, Shryock has brought into unusually sharp focus both theoretical and practical issues that reappear at many other sites, not the least being the early formative stage of Islam itself.

This is not a book with a simple thesis, but it does stick to a simple question, which turns out to cast a cold and telling light on a vibrant underworld of seldom-articulated social and political forces. The often idiosyncratic, fragmentary, and apparently ephemeral nature of much of the data Shryock gathered and analyzes has famously prompted many scholars before him to ignore it or dismiss it as arcane or folkloric. But his own tactic is to understand first the relationships among the situated native voices expressing these recollections. After that, he makes a convincing case for finding the coherence and concreteness of their accounts precisely in the ways they reflect a collective experience of disjuncture and distortion in the face of the standard national myth.

Shryock’s writing style is fresh, intelligent, and readable; it is also spiced with many colorful local touches. His scholarly apparatus, including an appendix containing transliterations of several ‘Abbadi and ‘Adwani heroic poems further enhances the usefulness of this excellent ethnographic probe into the meanings of Jordanian nationalism and, by easy extension, into the significance of tribal identity in an age of growing literacy, centralizing government, and standardizing religion.

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